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I. INTRODUCTION
I see the boys of summer in their ruin
Lay the gold tithings barren
Setting no store by harvest, freeze the soils.
Dylan Thomas'
N the summer of 1994, America endured the first labor dispute ever
to cancel the finish of a Major League Baseball season, including
the playoffs and World Series.2 It happened because the Major
League Baseball Players' Association, the union representing profes-
sional ballplayers, went on strike to stop owners from carrying out
their threat to impose unilaterally a salary "cap" 3 on the amount each
i. DYLAN THOMAS, I See the Boys of Summer, in COLLECTED POEMS (1939), quoted in
ROGER KAHN, THE BoYs OF SUMMER ix (1972).
2. For an account of the cancellation of the remainder of the season and the World Series,
see, e.g., Murray Chass, Baseball: The Season-Owners Terminate Season, Without the World
Series, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1994, at A 1; Ross Newhan, Baseball Season, Series Canceled, L.A.
Timms, Sept. 15, 1994, at Al. For accounts of the strike's beginning, see Murray Chass, Baseball
Is Given a Stop Sign as Strike Hour Arrives, N.Y. TiMS, Aug. 12, 1994, at AI ; Ross Newhan,
Owners Gripe as Baseball Strike Begins, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at Al.
3. A salary cap limits how much teams can spend on players' wages. A cap restricts a
ballclub's payroll, not how much a franchise might want to spend on such superstars
as Ken Griffey Jr. or Frank Thomas.
Of course, the more high-priced players a team signs, the less room it has under its
salary cap. A general manager would need to fill out the roster with inexpensive talent
if the payroll is eaten up by a half-dozen or so stars.
The owners' proposal would split revenues 50-50 with the players. Baseball is a $1.8
billion industry, so take that figure, divide by the number of teams (28), and divide
again by two (for the 50016 split) f'or a salary cap of $32 million [per team].
The owners want a ceiling of 110% of that average and a floor of 8407o. So the
proposal also sets a limit on how little a club can spend. Some franchises would have
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club may spend on its payroll.4
Things got worse. As summer turned to fall and then to spring, the
dispute persisted with no end in sight'-causing concern the 1995 sea-
son would be canceled before it even started.6 Finally, after 231
to increase payrolls.
Players oppose any form of a cap.
Cap Would Set Pay Ceiling, Floor, BASEBALL WEEKLY, Aug. 24-30, 1994, at 9.
On December 23, 1994, owners announced the unilateral implementation of their salary cap
demand. But in January 1995, faced with a potential unfair labor practice complaint by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for breach of the duty to bargain in good faith, owners
announced the cap would be dropped in favor of a "luxury tax" plan. This luxury tax would
impose a monetary penalty, the proceeds of which would be shared by other major league fran-
chises, on any owner who exceeded the mandatory payroll applicable to all clubs in a given year.
See, e.g., Associated Press, Clinton to Baseball: Keep Talking, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1995 at Cl
("Owners made their new proposal .. . asking for a 75 percent tax on the amount of payrolls
between $35 million and $42 million, and a 100% tax on the amount above that.")
Players insisted the luxury tax was really another salary cap with a new label. See, e.g., Ross
Newhan, Baseball's Owners, Players Renew Talks, L.A. TndEs, Feb. 27, 1995, at C14 ("The
issue still remains cost control and the owners' desire for a payroll mechanism that will slow
salary growth. Amid the optimism, there is the reality that the union will continue to oppose any
rate tax that works as a salary cap.")
4. Under federal labor law, see National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. §
185(d) (1988), once a collective bargaining agreement expires and negotiations between labor and
management for a new one have reached impasse, each side is free to deploy its "economic
weapons"-including strikes and picketing by labor and lock-outs and unilateral changes in
wages and working conditions by management. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962);
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
The Major League Baseball Players' Association ("MLBPA") called the strike for mid-
summer, threatening owners' revenue stream during lucrative pennant races, the playoffs, and
the World Series, in hopes of persuading them to drop their plan of unilaterally implementing
the salary cap before the start of the 1995 season. See, e.g., Ross Newhan, Players Call for Aug.
12 Walkout Date, L.A. Tn&ams, July 29, 1994, at Cl, C8 ("[T]he owners have made it clear that
they are prepared to unilaterally implement a salary cap without the players' consent after the
season ends, which leaves us with no choice [but to strike].") (quoting remarks of MLBPA
Executive Director Donald Fehr). But see id. at CI ("We believe that the Aug. 12 [strike] date
maximizes the chance of successfully negotiating an agreement without a work stoppage.")
(quoting remarks of MLBPA Executive Director Donald Fehr).
For a summary of the NLRA's affect on baseball, see generally Elliott Almond, Owners'
Main Weapon Hasn't Been Unsheathed, L.A. TtMas, Aug. 20, 1994, at Cl, C9.
5. Despite personal intervention by President Clinton, the parties remained far apart as
late as the week of the scheduled opening of spring 1995 training camps. See Ross Newhan &
Doyle McManus, Clinton Pitches Baseball Strike's Ball to Congress, L.A. Timis, Feb. 8, 1995,
at Al. In fact, each of three possible strike settlements was rejected during White House-bro-
kered talks: adopting a modified "luxury tax" plan recommended by presidential mediator Wil-
liam J. Usery (rejected by players); submitting the matter to binding interest arbitration while
returning to work for the 1995 season, suggested by the White House (rejected by owners, but
embraced by players); and conducting further presidential fact-finding while returning to work
(suggested by the players but rejected by owners). Id.
Mediator Usery said he had never seen such deep hostility in a career of mediating difficult
labor disputes. Id. at A19.
6. In a statement issued by the White House, President Clinton said "America has been
living without baseball for too long," noting that the walkout threatened the start of the 1995
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days-the longest strike in professional sports history7-ballplayers re-
turned to play an abbreviated 144-game schedule under an injunction
preserving pre-strike employment conditions,1 but without a final set-
tlement of the owners' demand for payroll cost controls. 9 It was a
state of affairs guaranteed to displease all.
Owners, who had schemed unsuccessfully for most of the past dec-
ade to limit players' salaries by means both legitimate 0 and illegiti-
mate," claimed as many as nineteen of the twenty-eight clubs were
losing money. 2 Skyrocketing player salaries, they argued, finally had
to be brought under control. 3
season. "It could well damage the economies of the spring training states. It is imperiling the
livelihoods of tens of thousands of workers whose jobs depend on baseball. And it is trying the
patience and depressing the spirits of millions of baseball fans-including me." Clinton, Mayors
Urge Baseball Negotiators to Resume Talks, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at D16 (Jan.
27, 1995). The President stopped short, however, of invoking his emergency powers to call for a
cooling off period during which the season might have been resumed for up to 80 days. See
Christopher D. Cameron, Bill, Just Pitch Around Congress, USA TODAY, Feb. 15, 1995, at I IA
(discussing lz'bor-management relations).
7. Ross Newhan, It's Now Official: Baseball to Return, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at Al.
8. The temporary injunction was obtained by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
pending the outcome of unfair labor practice charges that owners had bargained last summer in
bad faith. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee, Inc., Case No.
95 Civ. 2054 (SS), slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 1995) (Sotomayor, J.), reported in 1995 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 65, at D28 (Apr. 5, 1995).
9. Ross Newhan, It's Now Official: Baseball to Return, L.A. TItsS, Apr. 3, 1995, at Al,
A14. The strike cost owners about $700 million in revenues and players $200 million in salaries.
Id. at A14. At publication of this Article, the parties had yet to resume negotiations to complete
a new collective bargaining agreement.
10. Owners unsuccessfully proposed a salary cap during collective bargaining negotiations
in 1985 and 1990. See, e.g., Ross Newhan, Players Call for Aug. 12 Walkout Date, L.A. TIMES,
July 29, 1994, at Cl, C8.
11. See, e.g., MLB Players Ass'n & 26 Major League Clubs (1987) (Nicolau, Arb.) (collu-
sion grievance No. 2), reported in PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW
280-84 (1993) [hereinafter WEILER & ROBERTS].
For the background of these collusion cases, see JOHN HELYAR, LORDS OF THE REALM: THE
REAL HISTORY OF BASEBALL 310-63 (1994); Steven L. Willis, A Critical Perspective on Baseball;
Collusion Decisions, I SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 109 (1991).
Disputes over ballplayers' compensation have a long and tortuous history over which even
the principal combatants disagree. Compare MARvIN MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALLoGAM:
THE SPORT AND BUSINESS OF BASEBALL (1991) (memoir of former MLBPA executive director
giving union-side account) with BowIE KUHN, HARDBALL: THE EDUCATION OF A BASEBALL COM-
MISSIONER (1987) (memoir of former MLB commissioner giving management-side account).
12. See, e.g., Ross Newhan, Owners Set Stage for Baseball Strike, L.A. TIMEs, June 9,
1994, at C6.
13. See, e.g., Murray Chass, Baseball; High Noon Today as Walkout Will Be Set, N.Y.
TIMEs. July 28, 1994, at B13 ("The cost is too high. Indeed, [the union's counter-proposal]
moves in the opposite direction this game has to go in. The problems of this game will not be
solved by further increasing the amount of gross revenues that go to player compensation.")
(remarks of owners' chief negotiator Richard Ravitch); Ross Newhan, Eleventh-Hour Baseball
Negotiations Strike Out, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 11, 1994, at Al, All ("I have never seen so much
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Players responded by comparing the owners' traditional, often-re-
peated claim of financial woe to the claims of Chicken Little. 4 Be-
sides, players insisted, they would never compromise the free market
system that freed them from virtual chattel slavery 5 under the dreaded
"reserve clause" system16 and made them wealthy.
And fans who simply wanted to enjoy the game complained that
baseball's third mid-season strike and eighth work stoppage in the
past twenty-three years was yet again interrupting a precious summer
ritual.'1 A group of fans even announced plans to call its own
"strike" to remind owners and players about the people who watch,
and ultimately support, Major League Baseball. 1"
[economic] distress and despair among the clubs. For too many years we put off addressing the
problems until tomorrow, figuring they'd disappear, just go away, We now know tomorrow is
here and something has to be done. The future of the game is at stake.") (remarks of interim
MLB Commissioner Bud Selig).
14. See Tom Verducci, In the Strike Zone, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 1, 1994, at 26, 28
("[Olnce again the owners are busy running around chirping that the sky is falling-but they
really mean it this time-a warning the players won't believe unless a chunk whacks them on the
head.") (emphasis in original).
15. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 289 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
To non-athletes it might appear that [ex-St. Louis Cardinals' center fielder Curtis
Flood] was virtually enslaved by the owners of major league baseball clubs who bar-
tered among themselves for his services. But, athletes know that it was not servitude
that bound petitioner to the club owners; it was the reserve system. The essence of that
system is that a player is bound to the club with which he first signs a contract for the
rest of his playing days. He cannot escape from the club except by retiring, and he
cannot prevent the club from assigning his contract to any other club.
Id.
16. The "reserve clause," which was first introduced into Major League Baseball in 1887,
see Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198, 202-04 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890), is incorpo-
rated into article 10(a) of the Uniform Player's Contract. In pertinent part, it provides:
[T]he [Baseball] Club may, on or before December 20 .. . in the year of the last
playing season covered by this contract, tender to the Player a contract for the term of
the next year by mailing the same to the Player .... If prior to the March 1 next
succeeding said December 20, the Player and the Club have not agreed upon the terms
of such contract, then on or before 10 days after said March 1, the Club shall have the
right by written notice to the Player . . . to renew this contract for the period of one
year on the same terms ....
UNIFORM PLAYER'S CONTRACT art. 10(a).
Until 1975 it was thought article 10(a) gave the owner holding a player's contract the exclu-
sive right to his services in perpetuity. The famous arbitration case of pitchers Andy Messersmith
and Dave McNally, however, changed all that. Arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled article 10(a) means,
in the absence of an agreement to renew, a player's services belong to the club holding his con-
tract for just one year following expiration of the old contract. Afterward, the player becomes a
free agent. See Professional Baseball Clubs, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 101, 116 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.).
17. One poll showed 2907o of the public blamed the players for the strike, 34% blamed the
owners, and 1501o blamed both equally. Walter Shapiro, Bummer of '94, TIME, Aug. 22, 1994, at
68, 71 (Time/CNN survey).
18. See Dave Anderson, Strike Date? Look Who's Setting One, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1994,
at B6. Fans First, an organization formed by the merger of originally separate groups in Cleve-
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In virtually any other industry, what the owners were demanding-'
to "fix" the cost of labor for themselves and their competitors' 9-
would have been held illegal per se under the Sherman2
° and Clayton 21
Antitrust Acts. 2 An executive, for example, of an airline 23 or com-
puter software company 4 who sought a similar advantage would ex-
pose the firm, and possibly himself, to prosecution by the U.S.
Department of Justice for civil or criminal penalties, "5 as well as to
private suit by the independent competition for out-of-pocket losses
and treble damages.26
But baseball is not just any other industry. To many Americans, the
game is practically a sacred religious institution 7-and it has been
protected like one. For more than seventy years, club owners have
enjoyed immunity from the antitrust laws. A double-play combination
land and New York, planned to boycott major league games scheduled for August 13, 1994. Id.
The actual strike date, however, was moved up to Aug. 12-effectively canceling the fans'
"strike." See supra note 4. After the strike began, Consumer Federation of America and a
group calling itself Sports Fans United launched a petition drive to persuade Congress to repeal
baseball's historic antitrust exemption. See Fans Urged to Support Repeal of Baseball's Antitrust
Exemption, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 158, at D8 (Aug. 18, 1994); All Talk, No Action,
BASEBALL WEEKLY, Aug. 24-30, 1994, at 24.
19. Owners' representative Richard Ravitch repeatedly used the term "fix" to describe what
the proposed salary cap would do to labor costs. See, e.g., Murray Chass, Baseball; High Noon
Today as Walkout Will Be Set, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 1994, at B13; Richard Justice, Baseball
Players, Owners Remain at a Standstill; Fruitless Talks Point Toward Strike on Friday, WASH.
POST, Aug. 9, 1994, at El.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1988).
22. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., United States v. American Airlines, fnc., 743 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1984)
(upholding U.S. Justice Department's antitrust challenge against American Airlines based on
conversation between its president and president of Braniff Airlines).
24. See, e.g., JAMES WALLACE & JIM ERICKSON, HARD DRivE: BILL GATES AND THE MAKING
OF THE MICROSOFT EMPIRE 3-4, 372-81, 397-401 (1994) (discussing Federal Trade Commission
antitrust investigation of software giant Microsoft).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 26(1988).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
27. I believe in the church of baseball. I've tried all the major religions and most of the
minor ones. I've worshipped Buddha, Allah, Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva, trees, mush-
rooms and Isadora Duncan. I know things. For instance, there are 108 beads in a
Catholic's rosary and there are 108 stitches in a baseball. When I learned that, I gave
Jesus a chance. But it just didn't work out between us. The Lord laid too much guilt
on me. I prefer metaphysics to theology. You see, there's no guilt in baseball. And it's
never boring .... It's a long season and you gotta trust it. I've tried 'em all, I really
have, and the only church that truly feeds the soul, day in, day out, is the church of
baseball.
Annie Savoy, BULL DURHAM (Orion Pictures Corp. Studios motion picture 1988) (opening
speech delivered by actress Susan Sarandon). See also Thomas Boswell, The Church of Baseball,
in GEOFFREY C. WARD & KEN BURNS, BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 189 (1994) [herein-
after WARD & BURNS].
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of Supreme Court lawmaking,28 congressional inaction,2 9 and until re-
cently, public indifference, 0 has placed the National Pastime in a
privileged position. And although the strike of 1994 has encouraged
several members of Congress to introduce legislation that would over-
turn baseball's antitrust exemption, 3 none of those efforts is likely to
become law anytime soon.3 2
When labor disputes erupt in most industries, ripple effects may be
felt in other parts of the economy, but the impact of the ensuing bad
feelings and financial distress is confined mainly to the labor and
management combatants. Not even in the rare event of a professional
football strike will the games be stopped for long or the rituals of a
fall season be ignored."
By contrast, when a labor dispute erupts in professional baseball,
the summer comes to a halt. Both Time 4 and Newsweek" ring the
alarm on their covers. Sports networks, scrambling for replacement
programming, suddenly air games between teams at every skill level
from the minor leagues to Little League. 36 Serious political columnists
and other journalists, usually preoccupied with events in Washington,
28. A trilogy of Supreme Court decisions spanning 50 years granted baseball its antitrust
exemption. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346
U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam); Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
29. Despite having held extensive hearings and considered scores of bills over the years,
Congress has never enacted legislation modifying the antitrust exemption created for baseball by
the Supreme Court. For a review of much of this activity, see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281-
82, n.17 (1972).
30. See infra note 305 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 32, 113 (citing pending legislation).
32. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 14, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Mitchell, D-
Me.). In the broadcast, George Mitchell, then the Senate's majority leader, correctly predicted
his chamber would not have time to take up baseball's antitrust exemption before the summer
recess due to extended debate over health care reform and the President's crime bill. Id. Sen.
Mitchell's remarks were particularly relevant in light of his announced retirement at the end of
the year and his reported recruitment by owners to serve as the next commissioner of baseball.
Fans Urged to Support Repeal of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 158, at D8 (Aug. 18, 1994).
33. For example, a strike called by the National Football League Players Association
("NFLPA") during the 1987 season caused cancellation of just one week of games. Owners
continued the season for the next three weeks by hiring strike replacements and playing strike
defectors before the NFLPA called off the work stoppage and the regulars returned to play. See
Strikes in Pro Sports, L.A. Timas, Aug. 24, 1994, at C6. Of course, the strike did not interrupt
the extensive fall 1987 schedules of either American college football or the Canadian Football
League. For an account of labor strife in the NFL, see generally ROBERT C. BERRY, ET AL.,
LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 123-48 (1986).
34. TImE, Aug. 22, 1994 (headline: "Stee-rike!").
35. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1994 (headline: "Foul Ball!").
36. See, e.g., TV GUIDE, Aug. 20-Aug. 26, 1994, (listing programming for ESPN-l and
ESPN-2 networks).
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D.C.'s Federal Triangle, turn their attention to a geometric figure of
another shape: the baseball diamond.3 7 Movies are made. 38 Poems are
written. 9 Even Justice, our legal system's most hallowed symbol of
neutrality, takes off her blindfold to catch a glimpse of a star ball-
player and ask for his autograph.4
Canceling the remainder of a season also means unpaid vacations
for the legions of private and public business owners and their em-
ployees who operate industries dependent upon professional baseball:
brewers, concessionaires, equipment makers, hoteliers, parking-lot at-
tendants, sports-bar proprietors, stadium operators, tour operators,
and umpires all feel the pain.4'
With so much more at stake than a simple game, it is not too much
to ask whether the cause of all this social and economic dislocation,
the owners' demand for a salary cap, is worth the candle. An industry
already blessed with prized privileges in the eyes of the law ought to
articulate at least one sound reason it is entitled to yet another privi-
lege subsidized by the men who do the work and the consumers who
support them.12 This Article addresses whether the owners have made
their case that Major League Baseball needs a salary cap.
37. E.g., George F. Will, Tony Gwynn, Union Man, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1994, at 70
(chiding owners who long for the "good old days" of labor relations, which "were never nearly
as good as today"). Columnist Will has even devoted a book to the sport. GEORGE F. WILL, MEN
AT WORK (1992).
38. E.g., BASEBALL (PBS television broadcast Sept. 18-22, 25-28, 1994). Actually, film-
maker Ken Burns' 18.5-hour history of the game was in the works long before the 1994-95 labor
dispute but was broadcast by coincidence a month into the strike and by design just as pennant
races and playoff berths would have been determined. See WARD & BURNS, Supra note 27, at xvii
(preface to book and movie).
39. The pitcher's semi-pro-with admirable nerve/ With Walter Mitty dreams without
a breaking curve/ The catcher cannot catch. He also cannot throw/ Why call this
major league? The owners say it's so.
The opera season starts. The principal they hire/ A bass assigned no solos in his
church's choir/ Sings flat as the soprano in a grim duet/ If owners say it's so, will that
still be the Met?
Calvin Trillin, The Bigs, NATION, Apr. 17, 1995 at 514 (satirizing "replacement" ballplayers
hired by owners to break strike).
40. See, e.g., A Baseball Fan Judge Presents Barry Bonds With a Striking Decision, PEO-
PLE, Sept. 5, 1994, at 54 (reporting how family court Judge George Taylor reduced multimillion-
aire slugger Barry Bonds' alimony and child support payments then asked for Bonds'
autograph).
41. See, e.g., Thomas Bonk, Dodger Stadium's 'Real' Workers Will Feel Pinch, L.A.
TIMEs, Aug. 7, 1994, at C3; Mike DiGiovanna, Anaheim Cannot Find Way to Offset Walkout
Losses, L.A. TImEs, Aug. 7, 1994, at C3; Ara Najarian, The Hotels, Bars, and Restaurants Will
Suffer Too, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1994, at C3.
42. Under federal antitrust law, determining whether such justification exists is called a
"rule of reason" analysis. E.g., GEORGE W. SCHUBERT, ET AL., SPORTS LAW § 3.2, at 46-47
(1986) [hereinafter SCHUBERT, ET AL., SPORTS LAWI; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND
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Part 1I reviews the application of the antitrust laws to professional
sports in general and Major League Baseball in particular. 4 The Arti-
cle explores baseball's exemption from those laws and examines how
the breadth of this exemption has affected, not always for the better,
the business of the game.
Part III analyzes the owners' stated reason for demanding a salary
cap: to ensure "competitive balance" among major league teams. 44
The owners argue "big market" clubs such as the Los Angeles Dodg-
ers and New York Yankees must be prevented from buying champion-
ships at the expense of "small market" clubs such as the Montreal
Expos and Seattle Mariners.
A Major League Baseball division title, league pennant, or World
Series ring, however, is not for sale at any price. If it were, two as-
sumptions would have to be true: individual player talent would pre-
dict successful individual performance, and successful individual
performance would predict successful team performance.4 5
Neither assumption is true. The game of baseball is too unpredicta-
ble to permit an owner to purchase success merely by purchasing tal-
ent. There are three reasons for the fundamental unpredictability of
baseball.
First, the mechanics of hitting a pitched ball make success inher-
ently unpredictable. Success in baseball depends less upon a hitter's
accomplishing what he sets out to do (hitting the ball well) than upon
something over which he has little control (hitting the ball to a certain
location in fair territory where it will not be caught). This is why even
the game's best offensive players fail about 700o of the time at bat.46
Second, the rules of the game prohibit a club from maximizing the
participation of its "best" players47-a factor bound to minimize the
relationship between individual talent and team success. Merely hav-
ing a Babe Ruth, Henry Aaron, or even Ken Griffey Jr. in the dugout
is no guarantee he will ever get a turn at bat, much less succeed, with
the game hanging in the balance. 48
FEDERAL ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 142-45 (1985). For cases applying the rule of reason analysis to
anticompetitive conduct in sports, see, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85 (1984) (NCAA's television restrictions violated Sherman Act § 1); Regents of Univ. of
Calif. v. ABC, Inc., 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984) (similar provision in College Football Associa-
tion-ABC television contract violated Sherman Act §1); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976) (NFL's "Rozelle Rule" violated Sherman Act § 1), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
43. See infra notes 58-166 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 167-216 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 217-55 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 256-72 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
48. Id.
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Third, baseball's new playoff structure substantially exacerbates the
game's unpredictability and its random results. With twice as many
teams now eligible for post-season play, for the first time it is likely a
team which loses as many games as or fewer games than it wins during
the regular season can nevertheless qualify for the playoffs, and possi-
bly, the World Series.4 9
Part IV concludes with the thought that although the salary cap
makes little sense, the owners will demand one anyway.50 Given a law-
ful chance, few employers in any industry could resist putting a ceiling
on payrolls.
The salary cap proposal should be seen for what it is: merely the
latest offensive by owners in the war with players to decide who shall
determine the terms and conditions of employment in the industry.
For a century, owners enjoyed the power to dictate these terms unilat-
erally.5" That control ended in 1969, when the Major League Baseball
Players Association (MLBPA) emerged as a countervailing power ca-
pable of enforcing the players' demand to establish these terms bilat-
erally through collective bargaining.12 For the last twenty-five years,
owners have fought, so far unsuccessfully, to recapture absolute con-
trol.
At the heart of the problem is a tension inherent in every industry,
including baseball: labor feels entitled to share the profits, while capi-
tal sees labor as another cost standing in the way of those profits. 3
Therefore, resolving baseball's salary cap crisis means addressing not
only the owners' justification for it, the competitive balance theory,
but also the fundamental tension beneath it. Merely repealing base-
ball's antitrust exemption, as some have suggested5 4 would place an-
other weapon in the players' hands but would do nothing to
ameliorate the basic conflict.
Baseball is a special industry, and special cases deserve special solu-
tions. Other, more systemic changes, such as public ownership of
baseball franchises, creation of a players' league, and player owner-
ship of the clubs themselves, should be considered carefully. At an
average salary of $1.2 million55 and a minimum salary of $109,000,6
49. See infra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 298-314 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
53. For a thoughtful discussion of labor-management conflict in the context of the summer
1994 baseball strike, see Neal Gabler, The Owners: Baseball's Newest Heroes, L.A. TIMEs, Aug.
7, 1994, at MI.
54. See infra notes 112-13, 305 and accompanyinig text.
55. See, e.g., Walter Shapiro, Bummer of '94, TIarM, Aug. 22, 1994, at 70.
56. Id.
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today's major league player is wealthy enough to buy a stake in his
club and to start working for himself. He may find, as workers at
other employee-owned enterprises have learned,57 people who own the
company tend to avoid instituting strikes against themselves. Giving
ballplayers' a stake in the business could stabilize baseball's turbulent
labor relations to the benefit of those who depend on the major league
game-especially the fans.
II. FROM ANTITRUST TO INDUSTRIAL DISTRUST:
THE LAW AND BASEBALL
This Court's decision in Federal Base Ball . . . made in 1922, is a
derelict in the stream of the law that we, its creator, should remove.
Only a romantic view of a rather dismal business . . .would keep
that derelict in midstream.
William 0. Douglas s
A. Anticompetitive Behavior in Professional Sports
The era, if ever it existed, when sport was merely a diversion for
amateur participants and Sunday spectators is long past. Today pro-
fessional and amateur athletics alike "resemble any other highly suc-
cessful business enterprise capable of generating many millions of
dollars in revenues. Sport is packaged and marketed nationwide. It
has become an industry." 9
Part of sport's growth into an industry has meant learning to obey
the federal antitrust laws. Since 1957, when the Supreme Court re-
jected an antitrust exemption for the National Football League, 60
courts have applied the antitrust laws to nearly every major sport, in-
cluding professional basketball, 6' boxing, 62 golf, 63 hockey,64 and ten-
57. See infra notes 307-11 and accompanying text.
58. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation and footnote
omitted).
59. SCHUBERT, ET AL., SPORTS LAW, supra note 42, § 3.2, at 50. For a thoughtful analysis
of the subject, see generally JAmEs QUIRK & RODNEY D. FORT, PAY Dsr: THE BUSINESS OF
PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS (1992).
60. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
61. E.g., Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit Justice) (1971); Washington
Professional Basketball Corp. v. NBA, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
62. E.g., United States v. International Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
63. E.g., Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 846 (1966); Blalock v. LPGA, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
64. E.g., Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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nis. 65 Even nonprofessional sports generating significant revenues in
interstate commerce, including college athletics" and amateur soft-
ball, 67 have not escaped the grasp of antitrust regulation.
The cornerstone of federal law regulating anticompetitive behavior
is the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.6 The Sherman Act is directed
toward trade practices involving two or more competitors in interstate
commerce. 69 Its main provisions are section 1,70 prohibiting any con-
tract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce;
and section 2,7' prohibiting monopolization or attempts to monopolize
trade or commerce. 7
2
The Sherman Act's working partner is the Clayton Antitrust Act of
1914.13 The Clayton Act is directed toward anticompetitive behavior
by individual competitors as well as groups of competitors. 7 4 Applying
65. E.g., Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.
1981).
66. E.g., Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 577
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
67. E.g., Amateur Softball Ass'n v. United States, 467 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1972).
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (Supp. 1993).
69. See generally HOVKENKcM', supra note 42, at 50-54 (discussing legislative history of
federal antitrust laws).
70. 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 1993). "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1993). "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to mo-
nopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony .... " Id.
72. There are two classifications of anticompetitive behavior triggering Sherman Act liabil-
ity.
First, any trade practice that fails the "rule of reason" test is illegal. Under the rule of reason
test, a court must balance the alleged procompetitive effects of a challenged trade practice
against its anticompetitive results. If the former is outweighed by the latter, the practice is an
unreasonable restraint of trade. The existence of a less restrictive alternative to the challenged
practice is of vital concern to a court undertaking a rule of reason analysis. See SCHUBERT, ET
AL., SPORTS LAW, supra note 42, § 3.2, at 46-47.
Second, certain trade practices are considered so injurious that they are illegal per se-not-
withstanding any procompetitive effects they may have. A per se violation of the Sherman Act
automatically triggers liability without the need for a rule of reason analysis. Behavior classified
as a per se violation of section 1 includes any agreement to fix prices, any contract "tying" the
buyer to a promise not to deal with the seller's competitors, a group boycott, or a horizontal
division of markets. See id. § 3.2, at 47.
The trend under more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, is to discard per se
analysis in favor of the rule of reason approach for all claims of anticompetitive conduct. See,
e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 86 (1984). Even under this trend, Professor Sullivan
believes most of the anticompetitive practices discussed here, see infra notes 119-32, would be
found to violate the Sherman or Clayton Acts. See Lawerence A. Sullivan, The Viability of the
Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CALUi. L. REV. 835, 838, 847-48 (1987).
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (Supp. 1993).
74. See generally HOVKENKAMP, supra note 42, at 50-54.
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principally to sales of goods and services in interstate commerce, the
Clayton Act is somewhat narrower in scope than the Sherman Act.
The Clayton Act's main provisions are section 1,"1 prohibiting price
discrimination in the sale of the same product to similarly-situated
buyers; section 3, 76 prohibiting any "tying" contract; section 7, 77 pro-
hibiting acquisition of competing firms in the same industry; and sec-
tion 8,78 prohibiting interlocking directorates on the boards of
competing firms.
Although criminal sanctions may be imposed for violating either the
Sherman or Clayton Act, 79 the more common remedies are civil in na-
ture: an injunction or other equitable relief, 0 compensatory damages,
treble damages, and attorneys' fees and costs."1 Liability for treble
damages is the single biggest threat to a firm engaging in anticompeti-
tive behavior.
8 2
75. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
76. Id. § 14.
77. Id. § 18 (Supp. 1993).
78. Id. § 19.
79. Id. §§ 1-2, 13-14.
80. Id. § 26.
81. Id. § 15.
82. See, e.g., SCHUBERT, ET AL., SPORTS LAW, supra note 42, § 3.2, at 49.
Despite the application of the antitrust laws, in practice most professional sports teams are
shielded from actual liability for otherwise anticompetitive behavior due to the relationships
forged, however reluctantly, by club owners and players' unions through collective bargaining.
Federal labor law establishes two separate shields: the "statutory" labor antitrust exemption and
the "non-statutory" labor antitrust exemption.
The "statutory" exemption shields unilateral, concerted union activities, including secondary
picketing and the group boycott, taken in furtherance of union interests. This shield is mandated
by Congress. Clayton Act §§ 6, 20, 15 U.S.C. § 17; Norris-LaGuardia Act §§ 4, 5, 13, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 104, 105, 113. See, e.g., Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 782 (D. Minn. 1988) ("The statu-
tory labor exemption removes from the coverage of the antitrust laws certain legitimate, albeit
anti-competitive, union activities because they are favored by federal labor policy."). The statu-
tory exemption does not extend to agreements or actions between labor and non-labor groups.
See, e.g., Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J. 1987).
The "nonstatutory" exemption shields certain anticompetitive practices undertaken jointly
by labor and management so long as such practices are the product of collective bargaining. This
shield is not spelled out by Congress but has been implied by the courts to protect collective
bargaining agreements concerning the terms and conditions under which employees work. See
UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965) (immunity under nonstatutory exemption may be
removed if employees attempt to influence working conditions other than their own). In the
sports industries there is some debate whether the nonstatutory exemption survives both expira-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement and a subsequent impasse in labor-management nego-
tiations for a new contract. Compare, e.g., Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1301-02 (8th Cir.
1989) (corrected opinion) (yes as to both) with, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp.
125 (D.D.C. 1991) (yes as to expiration but no as to impasse), rev'd, 148 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2769
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (yes as to both). Some courts have suggested the nonstatutory exemption evap-
orates only when the players no longer wish the union to act as their exclusive bargaining repre-
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The only professional sport to escape application of the federal an-
titrust laws has been Major League Baseball. For reasons having more
to do with sentimentality than legality,83 the Supreme Court created
baseball's exemption out of whole cloth in 1922. Federal Base Ball
Club of Baltimore v. National League of Base Ball Clubs8' was an
action brought by the Baltimore franchise of the old Federal League,
the last serious rival to the two major leagues in this century, against
the sixteen teams in the National and American Leagues, the three
officials then running Major League Baseball, and three former own-
ers of Federal League clubs. The suit alleged that the defendants had
conspired to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act by preventing Balti-
more from launching a viable franchise. In fact, the Federal League
had folded in 1915 after just two seasons."
At trial, the jury returned an $80,000 verdict, which was trebled
under the provisions of the Sherman Act.86 But Baltimore's victory
was short-lived. On appeal, the judgment was reversed on the ground
that baseball was outside the scope of the Act.8 7 The Supreme Court
affirmed.88 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes offered
what was to become his oft-misquoted8 9 and much-criticized 9° explana-
tion that baseball was not subject to regulation by the Sherman Act
because it was not "trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use
of those words." 9'
sentative. See, e.g., Powell v. NFL, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1359 (D. Minn. 1991).
For discussions of these exemptions as they affect professional sports, see RAY YASSER, ET
AL., SPORTS LAW 262-64 (2d ed. 1994); Kieran M. Corcoran, When Does the Buzzer Sound?:
The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1045, 1051-53,
1059-71 (1994).
83. Mn.LER, supra note 11, at 127.
84. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
85. See WARD & BURNS, supra note 27, at 121-23.
86. National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs v. Federal Base Ball Club, 269 F. 681,
682 (2d Cir. 1920).
87. Id. at 688.
88. Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200(1922).
89. "It should be noted that, contrary to what many believe, Holmes did call baseball a
business; time and again those who have not troubled to read the text of the decision have
claimed incorrectly that the court said baseball was a sport and not a business." HAROLD SEY-
MOUR, BASERALL: THE GOLDEN AGE 420 (1971). For the text of what Holmes actually wrote, see
infra note 91.
90. See infra note 114 (collecting judicial and scholarly commentary).
91. The business [of baseball] is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state
affairs .... [T]he fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce
free persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is not
enough to change the character of the business .... [T]he transport is a mere inci-
dent, not the essential thing. That to which it is [an] incident, the exhibition, although
made for money[,] would not be called trade or commerce [as] in the commonly ac-
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Twice the Court revisited baseball's antitrust exemption over the
next half-century, but on both occasions reaffirmed it.
In 1953, in Toolson v. New York Yankees, 92 the Court rejected a
consolidated challenge to the "reserve" clause in the Uniform Play-
er's Contract brought by players in three separate cases on the ground
that Congress had had thirty years to overturn Federal Base Ball but
did nothing. 93 Toolson, however, was hardly a ringing endorsement of
precedent. Instructively, the Court spoke through an unsigned per
curiam opinion reaffirming Federal Base Ball without embracing
Justice Holmes' rationale. 94 For the first time, two Justices dissented
from a decision upholding a special antitrust exemption for baseball. 9
In 1972, in Flood v. Kuhn,9 the Court apologetically turned back a
similar challenge for essentially the same reason. 97 In that case, Curt
Flood, a longtime star center fielder for the St. Louis Cardinals who
had played in three World Series, sued the commissioner of baseball
to enjoin the Cardinals from trading Flood to the Philadelphia Phil-
lies against his wishes. Writing now for a majority of only five
Justices, 9s Justice Blackmun called Federal Base Ball "an exception
cepted use of those words. As it is put by [the] defendant[s], personal effort, not
related to production, is not a subject of commerce.
Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-
09 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
92. 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
93. Id. at 357.
Congress has had the ruling [in Federal Base Ball] under consideration but has not
seen fit to bring such business under these laws by legislation having prospective ef-
fect. The business has thus been left [out] for thirty years to develop, on the under-
standing that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation. The present cases ask
us to overrule the prior decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the legislation
applicable. We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application
to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.
Id.
94. See id. ("[The judgments below are affirmed on the authority of Federal Base Ball
Club ...so far as that decision determines'that Congress had no intention of including the
business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.").
95. Id. (Burton & Reed, JJ., dissenting).
96. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
97. Actually, the Flood Court purported to identify four separate reasons for the ruling by
the Toolson Court:
(a) Congressional awareness for three decades of the Court's ruling in Federal Base-
ball, coupled with congressional inaction. (b) The fact that baseball was left alone to
develop for that period upon the understanding that the reserve system was not sub-
ject to existing federal antitrust laws. (c) A reluctance to overrule Federal Baseball
with consequent retroactive effect. (d) A professed desire that any needed remedy be
provided by legislation rather than by court decree.
Id. at 273-74.
98. Id. at 259 (Blackmun, J., joined in pertinent part by Burger, C.J., Stewart, White &
Rehnquist, JJ.). Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. Justice Powell did not par-
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and an anomaly . .. an aberration confined to baseball."" He also
pointedly rejected Justice Holmes' rationale.100 But Blackmun an-
nounced that the Court was adhering to its prior decisions in both
Federal Base Ball and Toolson-while simultaneously adhering to its
prior decisions denying antitrust exemptions to other professional
sports. 10 1 "If there is any inconsistency or illogic in all this," he wrote,
"it is an inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be reme-
died by the Congress and not by this Court."'1 2
Four other Justices filed or joined separate opinions. 03 Chief
Justice Burger, although expressing "grave reservations,"' con-
curred nevertheless on the ground that too much time had passed for
the courts to be "the forum in which this tangled web ought to be
unsnarled."'' 0 Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Brennan, dis-
sented.' 6 He called Federal Base Ball a "derelict in the stream of the
law . . . [that the Court] . . . its creator, should remove."' In a foot-
note, Douglas recalled that he himself had joined the Toolson major-
ticipate.
In his book about the Court, journalist Bob Woodward revealed that, during conference
after oral argument in Flood, the initial vote was 5 to 3 to affirm, with Justice Marshall voting
for and Chief Justice Burger voting against adherence to Federal Base Ball. Then Justice Mar-
shall switched sides. With the vote now 4 to 4, which by the rules of the Court still would have
affirmed the Court of Appeals, Justice White showed signs of joining Marshall to provide the
fifth vote needed to end baseball's antitrust exemption. Meanwhile, Justice Powell's law clerks
tried to persuade him to do likewise rather than abstain. (Powell owned stock in Anheiser-Busch,
the brewery which controlled Flood's ex-employer, the St. Louis Cardinals.) In the end, the only
other member of the Court to switch his vote was Chief Justice Burger, who now voted for
Federal Base Ball-restoring the initial 5 to 3 margin in favor of stare decisis. See Boa WooD-
WARD & Sco-rr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 186, 189-92 (1979); accord MILLER, supra note 11,
at 199 (speculating what might have happened had Justices Black and Harlan not resigned the
prior year).
99. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 282 (Blackmun, J.).
100. Id. ("Professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce.").
101. See id. at 282-83.
102. Id. at 284. Justice Blackmun's final, baffling justification was that "there is merit in
consistency even though some might claim that beneath that consistency is a layer of inconsis-
tency." !d.
In his memoir, ex-MLBPA Executive Director Marvin Miller remarked: "I don't think I've
ever read such criticism of a majority decision of the court by the very justices who formed the
majority." MILLER, supra note I1, at 194 (emphasis omitted).
103. A fifth, Justice White, concurred in the judgment and in all of Justice Blackmun's
opinion except Part I, a screed whose principal purpose was to pay homage to the game by
listing the names of some 88 famous and not-so-famous ballplayers of bygone eras. HELYAR,
supra note 11, at 127 ("If the Supremes weren't embarrassed by their twisted logic, they should
have been by Justice Harry Blackmun's writing in the majority opinion.").
104. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 285-86 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
105. Id. at 286 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
106. Id. (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ity but had now "lived to regret it. ' 't °s Finally, Justice Marshall,
joined also by Justice Brennan, dissented too.'09 Marshall argued
Flood "was virtually enslaved by the owners of [Miajor [LJeague
[B]aseball clubs who bartered among themselves for his services."' 10
He observed over the years that the Court had "not lightly overrule[d]
our prior constructions of federal statutes, but when our errors deny
substantial federal rights . .. we must [freely] admit our error and
correct it.' "
B. Effect of Baseball Law on Baseball Business
Since 1972, attacks on baseball's antitrust exemption have been
mounted several times, but none has ever captured the support of ei-
ther the courts or Congress." 2 Nor is any likely to do so in the near
future, despite the recent efforts of several members of Congress."'
Accordingly, there is little point in rehashing once again the argu-
ments for and against baseball's antitrust exemption, and this Article
108. Jd. at 286 n.l.
109. Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 292-93.
112. Judge Moore's assessment, offered at the intermediate appellate stage of Flood, as to
the odds Federal Base Ball and Toolson might be overruled has so far proved correct. See Flood
v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 272 (2d Cir. 1971) (Moore, J., concurring) ("[Tlhere is no likelihood that
such an event will occur.").
113. The 103rd Congress did not pass any of the numerous bills before it. See, e.g., S. 2380,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (by Sens. Metzembaum, D-Ohio & Hatch, R-Utah); H.R. 4965,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (by Rep. Owens, D-N.Y.); H.R. 245, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)
(by Rep. Bunning, R-Ky.).
The 104th Congress, early in the first session, considered more than 10 pieces of baseball-
related legislation, at least eight of which addressed repeal or modification of baseball's antitrust
exemption. See, e.g., S. 15, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (by Sen. Moynihan, D-N.Y.); H.R.
749, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (by Rep. Torres, D-Cal.); H.R. 385, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (by Rep. Trafficant, D-Ohio); H.R. 365, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (by Rep. Schumer,
D-N.Y.); H.R. 120, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (by Rep. Bunning, R-Ky.); H.R. 106, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (by Rep. Bilirakis, R-Fla.); H.R. 105, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (by
Rep. Bilirakis, R-Fla.); H.R. 45, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (by Rep. Conyers, D-Mich.). For
summaries of these bills, see Rep. LaFalce Offers Bill to Establish National Baseball Commis-
sion, End Strike, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at D8 (Feb. 1, 1995).
In light of statements by congressional leaders, however, it remains unlikely any baseball legis-
lation will reach the President's desk during this session of Congress. See Christopher D. Came-
ron, Bill, Just Pitch Around Congress, USA TODAY, Feb. 15, 1995, at All ("If President
Clinton really wants major-league baseball played as scheduled on opening day this spring, then
he ought to know better than to ask his archrivals in the 104th Congress, Senate Majority Leader
Bob Dole and House Speaker Newt Gingrich, for legislative help."); Ross Newhan & Doyle
McManus, Clinton Pitches Baseball Strike's Ball to Congress, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 1995, at A19
(.'We maintain our view that Congress is ill-suited to resolving private labor disputes."') (re-
marks of Senate Majority Leader Dole and House Speaker Gingrich).
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-makes no attempt to do so. l" 4 But weighing the merits of the owners'
demand for a salary cap, we think it important to recognize the broad
impact that more than seventy years of immunity from "the Magna
Carta of free enterprise""'  has had on the baseball industry. In our
view, three observations are particularly important.
1. Broad Scope of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
The scope of baseball's antitrust immunity is quite broad. If they
consider the matter at all, fans tend to think of the exemption as a
shield protecting owners against claims by players who might other-
wise challenge undesirable terms and conditions of employment, such
as the reserve system or the barter method for transferring the rights
to players' services. 116 But the exemption created by Federal Base Ball,
114. That job has been thoroughly undertaken by others. For analysis of the antitrust laws
as applied to professional sports, see generally Phillip J. Closius, Not at the Behest of Nonlabor
Groups: A Revised Prognosis for a Maturing Sports Industry, 24 B.C. L. REV. 341 (1983); Lee
Goldman, The Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws as Applied to Employers' Labor Market
Restraints in Sports and Non-sports Markets, 1989 UTAH L. REv. 617; Michael S. Jacobs &
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars
in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971); Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Profes-
sional Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339; Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust
Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19 (1986);
Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints on the Labor Market: The Failure of Stare Decisis,
47 U. PITT. L. REV. 337 (1986); John C. Weistart, Judicial Review of Labor Agreements: Les-
sons from the Sports Industry, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (Autumn 1981); Note, The
Super Bowl and the Sherman Act: Professional Sports Teams and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HArv.
L. RE v. 418 (1967); Note, The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HARv. L. REv. 94, 170-73 (1957).
For analysis of the antitrust laws as applied to major league baseball in particular, see John
Eckler, Baseball-Sport or Commerce?, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 56 (1949); John W. Neville, Base-
ball and the Antitrust Laws, 16 FORDHAm L. REV. 208 (1947); C. Paul Rogers, III, Judicial
Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L.
REv. 611 (1977); Note, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68 HAv. L. REV. 105, 136-38 (1954);
Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE
L.J. 576 (1953).
115. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). There the Court said.
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of
free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms .... Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be fore-
closed with respect to one sector of the economy because certain private citizens or
groups believe that such foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more im-
portant sector of the economy.
Id. at 610, quoted with approval in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 291-92 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
116. The reserve system has been thwarted on antitrust grounds in other professional sports.
See. e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding NFL reserve clause illegal per
se); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding NBA reserve clause illegal
per se). See also, e.g., Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (holding old NFL "Roz-
elle Rule," requiring football player's acquiring club to pay free agent "compensation" to his
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Toolson, and Flood does much more than immunize the aggressive
labor practices of club owners. Baseball's antitrust immunity pre-
empts state as well as federal antitrust regulation,'"7 and it places up to
a dozen of the industry's current and prospective business practices
beyond the reach of these laws. "'
At least seven trade practices common in baseball would ordinarily
be vulnerable to antitrust attack as per se violations-that is, illegal
without regard for their alleged procompetitive effects." 9 The pro-
posed salary cap, 120 like any conspiracy to fix wages, and the long-
established reserve clause,' 21 which is still part of the Uniform Player's
Contract, could be challenged as price-fixing schemes. Control over
former club, illegal under rule of reason test). But cf. Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding reserve system necessary in professional sports).
Some scholars have questioned whether anticompetitive conduct in professional team sports,
which economists analyze as classic monopsony behavior, is properly the concern of the antitrust
laws at all. See generally WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 164-88 (discussing arguments for
and against such application).
117. Flood, 407 U.S. at 285-86 (1972). See also Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co.,
668 P.2d 674 (1983) (holding Flood preempts antitrust attack under California law against pro-
fessional football); WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 122 ("Flood did more than merely
maintain baseball's [antitrust] immunity from federal antitrust law-it also established, almost
offhandedly, a new exemption for baseball from state antitrust law."). But see Butterworth v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994) (Holding that be-
cause Flood undermines the basis of baseball's antitrust exemption, Federal Base Ball is limited
to its facts-immunity for the reserve system-and permits state antitrust regulation of other
aspects of the business of baseball).
118. There is now some dissent from the previously unquestioned view that the scope of
baseball's antitrust exemption is broad enough to immunize an owner from everything he does
while operating his business. Compare, e.g., Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 541
(7th Cir. 1978) (concluding the Supreme Court intended to exempt "the business of baseball, not
any particular facet of that business") with, e.g., Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp.
420, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (interpreting Flood as limiting the Federal Base Ball exemption "to
baseball's 'reserve system"') and Butterworth, 644 So. 2d at 1025 (concurring with Piazza). For
a discussion of the debate, see Latour R. Lafferty, The Tampa Bay Giants and the Continuing
Vitality of Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: A Review of Piazza v. Major League
Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993), 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1271 (1994).
The list presented here is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Counsel for plaintiffs challenging a
given trade practice under federal antitrust law may argue such practice is illegal per se, and if
not, unreasonable anyway. For a summary of the antitrust implications of typical trade practices
in professional sports other than baseball, see SCHUBERT, ET AL., supra note 42, § 3.2, at 53-63.
119. See supra note 72 (explaining per se violations).
120. Cf Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,747 (D.D.C. 1981)
(holding salary cap on compensation paid to NFL teams' "development squads" to be wage-
fixing and wage-fixing to be price-fixing).
121. Cf Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding NFL reserve clause illegal
per se); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding NBA reserve clause
illegal per se); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (holding NFL Rozelle Rule,
requiring football player's acquiring club to pay free agent "compensation" to his former club,
failed rule of reason test). But see Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(finding reserve system necessary in professional sports).
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player eligibility,'2 2 now exercised by the commissioner acting "in the
best interests of baseball," and the rookie draft, 23 which gives one
owner the sole right to deal with the drafted player, might be consid-
ered group boycotts. Limits on franchise movement 24 and barriers to
entry by would-be owners in cities without major league franchises'25
look like horizontal market allocations. Moreover, certain stadium fi-
nancing schemes, especially when packaged with season ticket sales,'2
appear to be tying contracts.
Five other trade practices would be vulnerable to attack for failure
to pass the "rule of reason" test-that is, illegal because their alleged
procompetitive effects are outweighed by their anticompetitive re-
sults. 27 Exclusive leases permitting clubs to use playing facilities,'28 ex-
clusive deals for the rights to telecast ballgames,129 potential mergers
122. Cf. Boris v. United States Football League, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,012 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (invalidating USFL 4-year rule requiring football player to have exhausted college
eligibility before entering professional draft); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp.
1315 (D. Conn. 1977) (striking down WHA rule requiring hockey player to have turned 20 be-
fore playing with any team); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049
(C.D. Cal. 1971) (striking down NBA 4-year rule). But cf. Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th
Cir. 1978) (rejecting attack on NHL bylaw making hockey players with only one eye ineligible to
play for member clubs); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.) (refusing
to find group boycott in rule denying golfers with prolonged lack of adequate performance entry
into PGA-sponsored tournaments), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966); Heldman v. United States
Lawn Tennis Ass'n, 354 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (denying injunction against rule banning
from USLTA events any tennis player who had competed in non-USLTA tournaments).
123. Cf. Drysdale v. Florida Team Tennis, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (holding
Pro Tennis Association's draft stifled competition for players' services); Kapp v. NFL, 389 F.
Supp. 73 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (holding NFL draft patently unreasonable for permitting perpetual
boycott of prospective draftees), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (1978); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593
F.2d 1173 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding NFL draft failed even to pass rule of reason test); Robertson
v. NBA, 390 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding NBA draft analogous to price-fixing),
124. Cf. Los Angeles Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 990 (1984) (permitting Raiders to move from Oakland to Los Angeles despite NFL rule
prohibiting unauthorized relocation of member club).
125. Id.
126. But cf. Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 498 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1974)
(allowing club requirement that purchasers of regular season tickets buy low-cost stadium bonds
too); Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir.) (finding no violation in alleged
tying between purchase of season and exhibition game tickets), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022
(1974).
127. See supra note 72 (explaining rule of reason analysis).
128. Cf. International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959) (holding defen-
dant's control over key U.S. boxing arenas, making it almost impossible for competitors to stage
championship boxing events without defendants' consent, was conspiracy in restraint of trade
and attempt to monopolize); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (hold-
ing NFL club's exclusive use of only municipal stadium in Washington, D.C., suitable for pro-
fessional football was restraint of trade at expense of potential clubs in the American and
Continental football leagues), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
129. Cf. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 95 (1984) (holding unrea-
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with competing leagues, 30 and limits on who may own franchises, 3 '
could all be considered attempts to monopolize the industry. Even dis-
cipline imposed by the commissioner's office'3 2 on ballplayers or own-
ers is subject to challenge as a conspiracy to deprive one of his right to
earn a livelihood.
The list is hardly exhaustive. Certainly creative plaintiffs' lawyers
would find other ownership practices vulnerable to antitrust attack
were it not for the breadth of the exemption.
In light of these vulnerabilities, the breadth of baseball's antitrust
immunity deserves comment. Imagine for the moment each of the
sport's principal actors, twenty-eight club owners, the two leagues,
and the commissioner's office, is named in just one civil antitrust law-
suit brought by a plaintiff having standing to bring an action alleging
merely one count of each of the twelve acts described above. We may
conservatively estimate baseball would face liability for up to 372 sep-
arate counts of anticompetitive conduct. The dollar value of the total
liability, once treble damages, attorneys' fees, and costs have been
added, would be truly staggering.
2. Dulled Competitive Edge
The breadth of baseball's antitrust exemption has been given much
credit for the game's survival as a big business, especially during the
economic vagaries of the mid-twentieth century.' But survival was
ensured at a price: it also has dulled the industry's competitive edge.
sonable NCAA plan limiting total number of intercollegiate football games member school may
televise); Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. ABC Inc., 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding unrea-
sonable similar College Football Association plan limiting broadcast of games against member
schools of the Pacific 10 Conference). But see Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp.
1993) (exempting from antitrust exposure joint agreements to telecast games of "organized pro-
fessional team sports," identified as football, baseball, basketball, and hockey).
130. Cf., e.g., Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding NBA-ABA
merger to violate Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts).
131. E.g., Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (permitting
challenge to MLB franchise ownership rules); Butterworth v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994) (same).
132. E.g., Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (challenging MLB Commis-
sioner A. Bartlett Giamatti's investigation of Cinncinati slugger Pete Rose for gambling).
133. See SEYMOUR, supra note 89, at 420 ("What really saved baseball, legally at least, for
the next half century was the protective canopy spread over it by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in the Baltimore Federal League anti-trust suit against Organized Baseball in
1922."). Baseball historian Seymour has written an important trilogy of books telling the story
of our National Pastime. See HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE PEOPLE'S GAME (1990); HAROLD
SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE (1971); HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS
(1960).
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Whether it is true that Major League Baseball is in financial distress
today, a point hotly contested by owners and players, 13 4 the fact the
question could even be asked reflects how poorly prepared for eco-
nomic competition baseball executives really are.
If baseball owners are correct in asserting the game faces financial
ruin, then they must admit to having squandered one of the most lu-
crative corporate welfare programs in American history. " ' Baseball
would join the ranks of other domestic industries, such as aero-
space, "16 automaking,117 computer manufacture,"' and private lend-
ing,3 9 which stumbled despite long histories of government subsidy
and token marketplace competition. Fans and players alike would be
within their rights to question, as free market economists might do,
whether the stewardship of baseball is in the proper hands.
If baseball officials are wrong then they must admit to having baser
motives. Sensing such motives, some players have called the demand
for a salary cap really a demand for guaranteed profits. 14° Naturally,
the typical business owner in any industry is not averse to earning a
guaranteed annual profit, if only there were a way to turn the trick
legally. The notion of underwriting net income as a legitimate collec-
tive bargaining goal, much less an entitlement, is alien to the Ameri-
can free market economy much the same way property ownership was
alien to the command economy in the former Soviet Union. As one
lawyer for the MLBPA put it, owners talk like "Adam Smith when
they're selling and Joseph Stalin when they're buying."'41
134. The debate is an old one. See HELYAR, supra note 11, at 326 (reporting that during 1985
collective bargaining negotiations the same data offered by owners to support their claim 21 of
26 teams had lost $41 million in 1984 was offered by players' economist and Stanford Professor
Roger Noll to show baseball had earned $25 million the same year). For a sampling of comments
by owners claiming financial distress over the years, see id. at 263.
135. See HELYAR, supra note 11, at viii ("Gentlemen, we have the only legal monopoly in the
country and we're fucking it up.") (quoting Atlanta Braves owner Ted Turner).
136. See generally WAYNE BIODLE, BARONS OF THE SKY: FROM EARLY FLIGHT TO STRATEGIC
WA.RFAR, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 288-328 (1991) (describing decline
of aerospace industry pioneers after World War II).
137. See generally PAUL J. INGRASSIA & JOSEPH B. WHITE, COMEBACK: THE FALL AND RISE OF
THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 19-34 (1994) (chronicling decline of Big Three automakers
in face of Japanese competition).
138. See generally PAUL CARROLL, BIG BLUES: THE UNMAKING OF IBM 65 (1993) (discussing
IBM corporate mentality that company did not need to change because it was already doing
everything right).
139. See generally STEPHEN PIZZO, ET AL., INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF AMERICA'S SAVINGS
AND LOANS (1989) (chronicling decline of thrifts across the nation).
140. Speech by Donald Fehr to Fifth Annual Entertainment Industry Labor and Employ-
ment Law Conference, Universal City, Calif., Oct. 5, 1994.
141. Mark Starr, We Was Robbed!, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1994, at 46, 51 (remarks of
MLBPA Associate General Counsel Gene Orza).
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Indeed, the lingo of baseball executives suggests they are interested
in a closed market rather than a free one. In an era when American
managers are obsessed as never before with learning how to beat the
competition, 42 baseball executives are obsessed with figuring out how
to avoid competition.'4 3 This obsession is especially ironic in sport,
where declaring winners and losers through competition is precisely
the reason the game is played.144
In such an environment, the industry's antitrust immunity ensures
the dulling of whatever competitive instincts owners might bring to
the business of baseball. Owners have little incentive to run their busi-
nesses well if their financial success is ensured no matter what they do.
One of the most persistent critics of the business acumen of baseball
executives has been one of their own: former Commissioner Peter
Uberroth. He told owners to their faces during his tenure they were
"dumb" and "stupid."' 14 He was incredulous when principal owners
would consider skipping industry meetings or sending underlings as
substitutes.' 46 During 1985 collective bargaining negotiations, Uber-
roth publicly denounced the owners' first demand for a salary cap as
"frivolous."' ' 47 Owners, he said, should "stop asking for the players
to solve their financial problems."'14
142. See generally GARY HAMEL & C.K. PRAHALAD, COMPETING FOR THE FUTURE (1994);
BENNETT HARRISON, LEAN AND MEAN: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF CORPORATE POWER IN THE
AGE OF FLEXIBILITY (1994); MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUS-
TAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1985); MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECH-
NIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS (1980); ROBERT SLATER, GET BETTER OR
GET BEATEN: 31 LEADERSHIP SECRETS FROM GE's JACK WELCH (1994).
143. See generally, e.g., MILLER, supra note 11, at 353-54 (discussing how lack of competi-
tion for fan's dollar under NFL's revenue-sharing scheme dulled competition among owners in
professional football).
144. References to "teamwork" and other sports metaphors are quite popular among con-
sultants advising American business how to be competitive. For a recent sampling, see, e.g.,
DONALD R. KATZ, JUST Do IT: THE NIKE SPIRIT IN THE CORPORATE WORLD (1994); JON R. KATZ-
ENBACH & DOUGLAS K. SMITH, THE WISDOM OF TEAMS: CREATING THE HIGH PERFORMANCE OR-
GANIZATION (1993); THOMAS A. KAYSER, TEAM POWER: HOW TO UNLEASH THE COLLABORATIVE
GENIUS OF WORK TEAMS (1994); DON MARTIN, TEAMTHiNK: USING THE SPORTS CONNECTION TO
DEVELOP, MOTIVATE, AND MANAGE A WINNING BUSINESS TEAM (1993); PAUL C. MILLER & TOM
GORMAN, BIG LEAGUE BUSINESS THINKING: THE HEAVY HITTER'S GUIDE TO TOP MANAGERIAL
PERFORMANCE (1994).
145. HELYAR, supra note 11, at 321. Uberroth liked to express his disdain for owners' eco-
nomic skills in parables:
"Let's say I sat each one of you down in front of a red button and a black button,"
he said at one early meeting. "Push the red button and you'd win the World Series
but lose $10 million. Push the black button and you would make $4 million and finish
somewhere in the middle."
He paused to look around. "The problem is, most of you would push the red one."
Id. at 322.
146. Id. at 320.
147. Id. at 326.
148. Id.
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3. Worsened Labor Relations
Labor relations in baseball are among the nation's most turbulent.
Since 1969, a labor dispute has threatened every three to four years to
interrupt spring training, the regular season, or both. 149 Players struck
in 1972, 1980, 1981, 1985, and 1994-95; owners locked them out in
1973, 1976, and 1990.150 Baseball's antitrust immunity is the single
most important factor in not only setting the stage for these quadren-
nial battles, but also prolonging their duration.'
The antitrust exemption epitomizes one of organized baseball's ba-
sic truths: since baseball turned pro in 1871,112 owners have controlled
virtually every facet of the business. Theirs is a control so complete
one commentator has referred to owners as "lords" and their industry
as a "realm."'' In the whole history of organized baseball, there has
been but one serious breach in the castle walls: the rise of the MLBPA
in the late 1960s. 114 By 1969, when the MLBPA took the first effective
concerted action in modern baseball history-players reported for
spring training but collectively refused to sign individual contracts un-
til they won increased pension benefits'155-the Lords of the Realm had
149. Typically each threat coincides with the expiration of the old collective bargaining
agreement and the negotiation of the new one.
150. E.g., Chapter 8?, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1994, at C8. A chronicle of baseball labor dis-
putes since 1969 reads as follows:
Year Type Days Games Lost Issue
1972 Strike 14 86 Pensions
1973 Lockout 12 0 Arbitration
1976 Lockout 17 0 Free agency
1980 Strike 8 0 Free agency
1981 Strike 50 712 Free agency
1985 Strike 2 0 Salary cap/arbitration
1990 Lockout 32 0 Salary cap/arbitration
1994 Strike 34* 434* Salary cap
*Owners canceled the remainder of 1994 regular season on Sept. 14, 1994. See Baseball Strike:
Developments from Day 34, L.A. Tiss, Sept. 15, 1994, at Cl. Counting the off-season and the
delay in starting the 1995 season, the 1994-95 strike lasted 231 days and cost 686 regular season
games (434 1994 games plus 252 1995 games). See Ross Newhan, It's Official: Baseball to Re-
turn, L.A. Tmras, Apr. 3, 1995, at Al.
151. See Thomas S. Mulligan, Baseball Antitrust Loophole May Strike Out, L.A. TImEs,
Sept. 22, 1994, at DI ("Without the antitrust exemption, baseball experts say, the owners would
not have pushed their demand for a salary cap to the point where players felt compelled to
launch the season-ending strike."). See also Ross Newhan, Fehr and Players Agree on Issues,
L.A. TrmEs, Sept. 28, 1994, at C2 (reporting players would return to work without a new collec-
tive bargaining agreement so long as Congress approved pending legislation to strip baseball of
antitrust immunity).
152. See WARD & BURNS, supra note 27, at 23.
153. HELYAR, supra note 11.
154. See generally MILLER, supra note 11.
155. Id. at 98-104.
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lost their absolute power to dictate the terms and conditions of em-
ployment:
Owners have waged a futile campaign to turn back the clock and
regain complete control ever since. The cocoon of baseball's antitrust
exemption has encouraged them. In professional basketball and foot-
ball, where antitrust immunity is dependent upon maintaining the col-
lective bargaining relationship rather than ignoring it, with the
Supreme Court's blessing, 5 6 work stoppages have been comparatively
unknown. 17
Indeed, while owners in other industries have recently championed
cooperative approaches to industrial relations," 8 baseball's owners
have demanded unconditional surrender.15 9 But they have yet to cap-
ture a white flag. Instead, the undisputed winner in each of baseball's
prior labor disputes (identifying a victor is not so easy when labor and
management clash in other industries) has been the MLBPA.'6
Repeated defeat has not persuaded owners to choose cooperation
over confrontation. In fact, over the years each of the owners' princi-
pal collective bargaining proposals has revisited precisely the types of
hot button issues they knew the players would not alter voluntarily. 6'
In 1969 and 1972, owners proposed holding the line on or reducing
pension benefits. Instead they agreed to raise them. 6 2 In 1976, 1980,
and 1981, owners proposed severely restricting free agency. Instead
they settled for the changes that have made players so rich today. 63 In
1973, 1985, and 1990, owners proposed capping salaries. Jnstead they
settled for no cap.'64 These proposals were all-or-nothing gambits. If
the players went along, then they were giving away their hardest-won
victories. If the players fought and lost, then they would have to take
156. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 33 and 82 and accompanying text.
158. Much has been written in both the popular and scholarly presses on this subject. For a
sampling, see COMMISSION ON TiE FuTurE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Dec. 1994). This document, known as the Dunlop Commission Report, sets
as the top goal for the 21st century marketplace the "Expanded coverage of employee participa-
tion and labor-management partnerships to more workers and more workplaces and to a broader
array of decisions." Id. at 4.
159. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 141, at 49. "In disputes with owners from 1969 to 1990, the
MLBPA is 8-0." Christopher D. Cameron, Lessons for Labor Unions, USA TODAY, Oct. 20,
1994, at A13. Some commentators from the start suggested that the owners' plan of action was
doomed to failure. See Mike Downey, Owners Haven't Got a Chance, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12,
1994, at C 1.
161. See HELYAR, supra note 11, at 5,87,91,95, 110-13, 117, 156-57, 221-22, 259, 286.
162. See, e.g., id. at 86-87, 110-13.
163. See, e.g., id. at 156-57, 221-22, 286.
164. See, e.g., id. at 325-27, 395, 417-18.
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whatever scraps owners were willing to throw from the table. Either
way, the MLBPA" would become weaker, and be ripe for the picking
at the next round of negotiations.
After nearly a quarter-century of experience dealing with a strong
union, most employers would face facts and approach negotiations
with the sort of respect a mature collective bargaining relationship de-
serves. 65 Club owners have not. The reason, in part, is that their un-
successful labor relations practices are out of synch with their
successful trade practices in practically every other aspect of the base-
ball business. Owners, for example, are used to getting away with the
types of anticompetitive behavior listed above.'" Labor relations, they
figure, should be no different. Owners may believe if they keep press-
ing the MLBPA to the limit, then eventually the power they have re-
luctantly shared can be wrested away. In the meantime, owners pay
no price under the antitrust laws for trying.
III. THE CASE AGAINST THE SALARY CAP
You go through The Sporting News for the last one hundred years,
and you will find two things are always true. You never have enough
pitching, and nobody ever made money.
Donald Fehr 67
A. Shooting the "Competitive Balance" Theory
Owners say baseball needs a salary cap to ensure large and small
market clubs have an equal chance to compete for the fruits of vic-
tory: division titles, league pennants, and World Series rings. In nego-
tiations with the MLBPA last summer, owners called this goal
"competitive balance,' '1 68 so we will refer to the stated justification
for the salary cap as the "competitive balance" theory.
The competitive balance theory hypothesizes that unless all the
teams in each league agree to salary parity, great salary disparities
165. Ken Moffett, former baseball mediator and one-time MLBPA executive director, ex-
plains the dynamic driving baseball's labor relations: "There's no trust between these people,
.. and with good reason. When there's no trust, all you have are Band-Aid [solutions). Any-
way, how can you have trust in an adversarial situation?" Paul White, Moffett: New Wrinkles,
Same Mistrust, BASE BALL WEEKLY, Aug. 24-30, 1994, at 9.
166. See supra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
167. Executive Director, Major League Baseball Players' Association, quoted in HELYAR,
supra note 11, at ix.
168. See, e.g., Ross Newhan, Patiently and with Foresight, Indians Stuck to Plan, L.A.
TmEs, June 19, 1994, at C12.
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among teams will emerge. Wealthier clubs in the larger markets, such
as Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York, will outspend poorer clubs
in the smaller markets, such as Montreal, San Diego, and Seattle, and
sign the most talented players. By cornering the talent market, the
larger clubs will essentially buy division titles, league pennants, and
World Series rings, thereby monopolizing success in the sport. By con-
trast, smaller clubs will struggle merely to finish respectably.
The theory also projects that, as an oligarchy of wealthy teams
emerges, we would see the same clubs playing for the championship
year in and year out. As the smaller clubs become athletically inferior,
fan support will dwindle, leaving small market clubs economically
marginalized, if not bankrupt. Thus the sport's competitive balance
will be destroyed. 169
The main problem with the competitive balance theory is the lack of
empirical evidence supporting it. If owners had to defend an antitrust
challenge to the salary cap based pnly upon the competitive balance
theory, then surely the salary cap would fail even a rule of reason
analysis. 70 Indeed, all the evidence points in precisely the opposite di-
rection: baseball enjoys remarkable competitive balance without a sal-
ary cap.' 7
We examined the period 1983 to 1992, the last complete decade
of Major League Baseball competition before expansion in 1993.
This is the same decade during which the average baseball player's
salary jumped from about $200,000 to more than $1 million.' Of
the twenty-six franchises competing during this ten-year period,
twenty different teams won the forty available division titles.'7 3
169. See, e.g., Houston Mitchell, Baseball '94: Going, Going . . . Gone; Ending Leaves
Many Questions, Unpleasant Answers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at C9.
170. See supra note 72 (explaining rule of reason analysis).
171. By 1991, Major League Baseball had lived and flourished through fifteen years of
free agency. It no longer has to rely on economists' theoretical arguments to know the
impact of free agency on competitive balance. By any measure, competitive balance
has not only not become more unequal since 1976, it has become noticeably more
equal.
ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BLnIONs: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIo BUSINESS OF OUR
NATIONAL PASTIME 95 (1992).
Professor Zimbalist compared competitive balance before and after the advent of free agency
in 1975. During the first 15 seasons of free agency, 12 different teams won the World Series and
16 different teams played for the championship. Only 3 teams-the Seattle Mariners, the Cleve-
land Indians, and the Texas Rangers-failed to win division titles. During the period before free
agency, however, a handful of teams dominated the game. From 1903 to 1970, teams from the 4
biggest cities won 49 of 68 pennants. From 1903 to 1964, a New York team won 39 of 61 World
Series. The Yankees dominated the era. From 1926 to 1964, they posted 39 consecutive winning
seasons and finished first 26 times. Id.
172. See Soaring Sums, TIME, Aug. 22, 1994, at 70 (charting rise in average salaries).
173. See infra Table 1.
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Fifteen different teams won the twenty available league pen-
nants. 174 And nine different teams won the ten available World
Series championships.' 75  Every team seemed to have an equal
chance at achieving success, failure, or mediocrity.
1. Success or Failure in the National League
176
From 1983 to 1992, all twelve teams in the National League finished
dead last at least once. Eleven teams finished in first place at least
once. Tables I and 2 provide the details:
174. TEAMS WINNINo AVAILABLE PENNANTS
National League Club Year American League Club Year
Philadelphia 1983 Baltimore 1983
San Diego 1984 Detroit 1984
St. Louis 1985, 1987 Kansas City 1985
New York Mets 1986 Boston 1986
Los Angeles 1988 Minnesota 1987, 1991
San Francisco 1989 Oakland 1988, 1989, 1990
Cincinnati 1990 Toronto 1992
Atlanta 1991, 1992
For the data on which these figures are based, see THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA passim (9th ed.













176. For the seasons 1983 through 1992, National League clubs performed as follows:
Club Winning Percentage



































































177. Id. at 464-521.
178. Id.
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The data show every team except the small market Montreal
Expos 79 finished at both the bottom and the top of its division within
the same decade. No team won as much as 55% of its games and no
team lost more than 550 of its games. 80 Seven of the franchises were
within 1% or less of winning 500%o of their games. 8 ' A team at the
bottom of the division could reasonably expect to be at the top within
a few years. 8 2 The teams in the largest markets-New York, Los An-
geles and Chicago-won just under 520%o of their games.'83
2. Success or Failure in the American League'84
The story is much the same in the American League. During the
same decade, eleven of the fourteen teams finished in last place at
least once. Nine teams finished first at least once. Tables 3 and 4 pro-
vide the details:
179. If the 1981 and 1982 seasons are included, then we can say every team has finished first
at least once. (The Montreal Expos won the National League East pennant in 1981.) Id. at 455.
This is also true if the shortened 1994 season is included. As of August 12, 1994, the date the
strike began, Montreal was not only leading the National League East by six games, but also
enjoying the best record in baseball (74-40, .649). Final 1994 Major League Baseball Standings,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at C12.
180. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 464-521.
181. Id.
182. For example, the Atlanta Braves finished last three years in a row (1988, 1989, and
1990) only to finish first the next three years in a row ( 1991; 1992, and 1993). Moreover, the
Pittsburgh Pirates finished last three years in a row during the mid-1980s (1984, 1985, and 1986)
only to finish first three years in a row during the early 1990s (1990, 1991, and 1992). Finally, the
San Francisco Giants finished last two years in a row (1984 and 1985) but two years later fin-
ished first (1987). Id.
183. The combined winning percentage of the New York Mets, Los Angeles Dodgers and
Chicago Cubs was .515. Id.
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Nearly half the league (six teams) finished at the bottom and the top
of their divisions within the decade. 87 No team during the decade won
more than 57% of its games and only one team" lost that many. Five
185. BASEBALL.ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 464-521.
186. Id.
187. If the 1981 and 1982 seasons are included, then the number expands to 11 teams. (The
small market Milwaukee Brewers shared the American League East title with the New York
Yankees during the strike-shortened 1981 season and won it outright in 1982.) Id. at 455-64.
188. The Cleveland Indians were one of the more unfortunate victims of the 1994 strike. At
the time the strike was called they had the third-best record in the American League (66-47, .584)
and were a serious threat to qualify for a "wild card" spot in the playoffs. Final 1994 Major
League Baseball Standings, L.A. TiMEs, Sept. 15, 1994, at C12. The Indians have not played in
the post-season since 1954 and, as Cleveland fans can attest, remain an enigma.
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teams fell within 1% of the 50% mark. The big market teams in New
York, Southern California, and Chicago won just over 50% of their
games. 189 Like their National League counterparts, most American
League teams at the bottom could reasonably expect to rise to the top
within a few years.190
3. Winning it All
A full 162-game regular season of Major League Baseball lasts
about five months. The club expected to win the World Series is usu-
ally the one with the superior record at the regular season's end. This
happened only four times, however, in the ten Series played during
the decade in question. In six Series, the "weaker" team actually won
the championship. Table 5 provides the details:
TABLE 5191
World Series Winners and Losers, 1983-1992
Year Winner Record Loser Record
1983 Baltimore 98-64 Philadelphia 90-72
1984 Detroit 104-58 San Diego 92-70
1985 Kansas City 91-71 St. Louis 101-61
1986 New York Mets 108-54 Boston 95-66
1987 Minnesota 85-77 St. Louis 95-67
1988 Los Angeles 94-67 Oakland 104-58
1989 Oakland 99-63 San Francisco 92-70
1990 Cincinnati 91-71 Oakland 103-59
1991 Minnesota 95-67 Atlanta 94-68
1992 Toronto 96-66 Atlanta 98-64
This persistence, rather than absence, of competitive balance is best
understood as the result of a phenomenon more prominent in baseball
than in other professional team sports: 192 unpredictability.
189. The combined winning percentage of the New York Yankees, California Angels, and
Chicago White Sox was .502. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 464-521.
190. For example, the Minnesota Twins finished last in 1990 and first in 1991. The Califor-
nia Angels did the reverse, finishing in first in 1986 and last in 1987. The Toronto Blue Jays have
won the last three Eastern Division titles, but were near the bottom of the division (55-60, .478)
when the 1994 strike began. Final 1994 Major League Baseball Standings, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 15,
1994, at C12.
191. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 464-518, 2798-2825.
192. We define "other professional team sports" here as professional basketball as played in
the National Basketball Association and professional football as played in the National Football
League. Inasmuch as a large part of a professional sports franchise's revenues are derived from
network television contracts, we only include football and basketball here and not hockey be-
cause, at least until recently, the National Hockey League had no network television contract, as
it now does with the Fox network.
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Consider the binary system, a system which produces only two out-
comes. Coin-tossing is a classic binary system because its outcome is
always heads or tails. 93 In a perfectly random,' 94 binary system, the
outcome goes one way (heads) 50% of the time and the other way
(tails) 50% of the time. It is impossible to predict outcomes in such a
system, because at any given time, each possible outcome-heads or
tails-has an equal chance of occurring.
Like coin-tossing, a professional team sport-such as Major League
Baseball, NBA basketball, or NFL football-is a binary system.' g9
The outcome is virtually always win or lose.1 96 But, unlike coin-toss-
ing, a professional team sport is not supposed to produce random out-
comes. The results are supposed to be stratified because various
factors, especially talent, are unequal from team to team. That is, a
"better" team-a team with more talent than other teams-should
win more than 50% of its games. Indeed, a "great" team should win
a lot more than 5007o of its games. In such a system it becomes theo-
retically possible to predict outcomes by first assessing the relative tal-
ent of competing clubs.
We can test the generally held belief that the outcomes of baseball
games are predictable, rather than random, by comparing the winning
percentages of the most successful teams in each of the three major
sports.
Since 1947,' 9 7 the average winning percentage of a championship
193. Coin-tossing is a purely random system because a coin tossed in the air 100 times, on
average, comes up heads 50 times and tails 50 times.
194. A simple random sample is one in which the elements of the population are listed,
and then N of them are randomly selected to be elements of the sample. The random
selection is carried out in such a way that (1) every element in the population has an
equal probability of being included in the sample, and (2) every possible combination
of N elements has an equal probability of constituting the sample. Random selection
does not mean haphazard selection; rather it means a selection process that gives each
element in the population an equal chance of appearing in the sample.
HERMAN J. LOETHER & DONALD G. McTAVISH, DESCRIPTIVE AND INFERENTIAL STATISTICS 374
(1976) (emphasis omitted).
195. See BILL JAMES, THE BILL JAMES HISTORICAL BASEBALL ABSTRACT 290 (Villard rev. ed.
1988) ("Winning percentage is [baseball's] one constant statistic; it stays at .500000 in every
decade, in every park, in every season, in every game and on every pitch. Everything that hap-
pens is good for one team precisely in the degree to which it is bad for the other.")
196. The only time the outcome is otherwise is during regular season professional football
games. Occasionally final scores will result in ties. This does not affect the analysis since a tie is
counted as half a win and half a loss in the standings.
197. The statistics herein begin with the year 1947 for two reasons. First, 1947 was the first
year all three professional sports organizations discussed in this Article, Major League Baseball,
the NBA, and the NFL, co-existed. (The 1946-47 season marked the NBA's debut.)
Second, and more important, 1947 was the year the color line was broken in baseball. Argua-
bly all baseball statistics before this time are invalid inasmuch as a large percentage of the best
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club is 81.1% in football,19  70.4% in basketball,'9 and 61.0% in
baseball. 200 Baseball's results are the closest of the three to 50%, so
therefore a baseball team's comparative success appears to be the
most random. How often does a champion football team win as infre-
quently as the average champion baseball team? It has never hap-
pened.20 1 How often does a champion basketball team win as little as
the average baseball team? It has happened only 10% of the time over
the last thirty-five years. 202 Conversely, how often does a champion-
ship baseball team win as frequently as an average champion football
or basketball team? Never and rarely, respectively.20 1
Moreover, if regular season play is the true measure of a successful
team, then the team with the better record should win the champion-
ship more often. In football, the team with the better record wins the
baseball players were excluded from participation. Only ethnocentrism can explain why histori-
ans continue to refer to organized baseball before 1947 as being Major League Baseball on the
one hand and the Negro Leagues as something less on the other. After all, of the 438 games in
which teams from all-White Major League Baseball and the all-Black Negro Leagues faced each
other during baseball's segregated period, the Negro Leagues team won 309 games, or 71°70 of all
contests. WARD & BuRsS, supra note 27, at 198. Perhaps it would be better to view the two
organizations as the White Leagues and the Black Leagues.
Of course, 1947 did not represent the year in which baseball was integrated. Having only one
African-American, Brooklyn Dodger infielder Jackie Robinson, playing in the National League
hardly qualified as integration. Major League Baseball was probably not fully integrated until
the early 1960s.
Interestingly, the demise of the New York Yankees' dynasty (1921-1964) coincides with the full
integration of baseball and is epitomized by the Yankees' defeat in the 1964 World Series at the
hands of the St. Louis Cardinals. The Cardinals' success that year was due primarily to the
contributions of young African-Americans: outfielders Lou Brock and Curt Flood, pitcher Bob
Gibson, and first baseman Bill White. The Yankees remained a team of aging Whites: outfield-
ers Mickey Mantle and Roger Maris and pitchers Whitey Ford and Bill Terry. For a thoughtful
review of the 1964 season, see generally DAVID HALBERSTAM, OCTOBER 1964 (1994). Nobody
knows how many championships the Yankees would have won had they faced the likes of
Satchel Paige, Josh Gibson, "Cool Papa" Bell, Buck O'Neill, or other Negro Leagues stars in
their prime.
198. See generally DAVID S. NEFT, ET AL., THE SPORTS ENCYCLOPEDIA: PRO FOOTBALL (1993)
[hereinafter NEFT, ET AL., PRO FOOTBALL] (recording yearly team results).
199. See generally DAVID S. NEFf & RICHARD M. COHEN, THE SPORTS ENCYCLOPEDIA: PRO
BASKETBALL (1992) [hereinafter NEFfT & COHEN, PRO BASKETBALL) (recording yearly team re-
sults).
200. See generally BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA (8th ed. 1993) (recording yearly team results).
201. No championship football team since 1947 has won as few as 61% of its games. See
NEFT, ET AL., PRO FOOTBALL, supra note 198.
202. Only four championship basketball teams in the past 35 years failed to win 60% of their
regular season games: the Washington Bullets (1977-78), Portland Trailblazers (1976-77), Golden
State Warriors (1974-75), and Boston Celtics (1968-69). See NEFT & COHEN, PRO BASKETBALL,
supra note 199.
203. No professional baseball team since 1885 has ever won 80% of its games, and since
1947 only one club, the 1954 Cleveland Indians, has won 70%. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 174, at 87-521.
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Super Bowl 71.10162°4 of the time. 2 5 In basketball, the team with the
better record wins the NBA championship series 71.707o of the time.2°6
In these sports, success is predictable. In a given season, picking the
ultimate winner in these sports is relatively easy.
What about baseball? Since 1947 the team with the better record
has won the World Series only 44.10o of the time. 20 1 In sum, the out-
come of the World Series is relatively difficult to predict, because
about half the time the team having the better record wins and about
half the time it loses.
Many things could influence this number, but most of them are
probably insignificant. Take two examples: home field advantage and
relative league strength. Neither factor changes the result.
As to the former, since 1947 the team with the home field advan-
tage in the World Series has won if only 46.80 of the time.
208
As to the latter, it could be that a team's regular season record is
irrelevant since there is no inter-league competition and one league
could be stronger than the other. There is no good way to measure
relative league strength. One superficial indicator is All-Star game re-
sults. One could surmise the league that wins the All-Star game is be
the "stronger" league. And how often does the "stronger" league win
the World Series? Since 1947 the All-Star winning league has won the
World Series just 48.9% of the time. 209
In sum, if a fan was given her choice of predicting the World Series
winner based on regular season record, home field advantage, relative
league strength, or tossing a coin, she would be best off tossing a
coin. This is hardly surprising given the random nature of the baseball
204. This number includes NFL championships from 1947 to 1965 (before the Super Bowl
was established to decide league championships).
205. Over the last 47 years, the team with the better record, among the finalists, has won the
championship game 32 times and lost 13. In two games, the competitors had identical regular
season records, so these years were excluded from the calculation. See NEFT, ET At., PRO FOOT-
BALL, supra note 198.
206. Over the last 46 years, the team with the better record among the finalists has won the
NBA finals 33 times and lost 13. See Nvrr & CoHEN, PRO BASKETBALL, supra note 199.
207. Over the last 47 World Series, the team.with the better record among the finalists has
won 19 and lost 24 series. The 1949, 1951, and 1958 seasons were omitted because the teams had
identical regular season records. The 1981 season was omitted because a strike canceled a signifi-
cant part of the season. See BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174.
208. The site of the World Series rotates between the National League and American League
every year. In the 47 Series since 1947, the team with home field advantage at the outset of the
series has won 22 series and lost 25. Id.
209. The 1959 and 1962 seasons were excluded from this calculation because in both years
two All-Star games were played with each league winning one contest. Tm BASEBALL ENCYCLO-
PEDIA, supra note 174, at 2832-33.
19951
862 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:827
enterprise,2 10 a phenomenon that is probably heightened under the
random pressures of a short World Series schedule.
A last comment about competitive balance and "winning it all."
During the past fifteen years, eighteen different baseball franchises
have participated in the World Series, with no team making more than
three appearances. 21' On average, a different team is in the World Se-
ries every year. Baseball is a sport in which each club has almost an
equal opportunity to win a championship ring.
By contrast, NBA basketball-which had a salary cap for more
than a decade2 "-is not such a sport.2 13 During the past fifteen years,
only nine franchises have made the NBA Finals, and fourteen of those
appearances were made by either or both the Los Angeles Lakers and/
or Boston Celtics combined.2 1 4 Historically, a Lakers or Celtics team
has played in the championship series nearly every year.215
Therefore, the evidence is fatal to the theory that there will be no
competitive balance absent a salary cap. There is no salary cap now
and baseball enjoys competitive balance. Perhaps that is why New
York Yankees' owner George Steinbrenner announced his support for
his colleagues' salary cap demand, but not their justification for it.
"You can shoot that theory right in the butt," he said.216
B. Salary Cap Assumptions: Talent and Success
Two assumptions about the relationship in baseball between talent
and success21 7 are critical to the feasibility of the competitive balance
210. See infra notes 256-83 and accompanying text.
211. Toronto (1992 & 1993), Minnesota (1987 & 1991), Oakland (1988-1990), Boston (1986),
Kansas City (1980 & 1985), Detroit (1984), Baltimore (1979 & 1983), Milwaukee (1982), New
York Yankees (1981), Atlanta (1991-1993), Cincinnati (1990), San Francisco (1989), Los Angeles
(1981 & 1988), St. Louis (1982, 1985, 1987), New York Mets (1986), San Diego (1984), Philadel-
phia (1980 & 1983), Pittsburgh (1989). BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 2782-2825.
212. For background on the salary cap in the NBA, see Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp.
960 (D. N.J. 1987).
213. Football lies somewhere in between. Injuries to key offensive players, among other rea-
sons, reduce somewhat the game's predictability.
214. Los Angeles Lakers (1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991) and Boston
Celtics (1981, 1984, 1985, 1986). See NEFT & COHEN, PRO BASKETBALL, supra note 199.
215. This holds true for the NBA since its inception. In 47 years of championship play, the
Lakers or Celtics have made the finals an amazing 42 times (Lakers 23, Celtics 19). Id.
216. Starr, supra note 141, at 51 (quoting New York Yankees' owner George Steinbrenner).
Interestingly, for all Steinbrenner's well-publicized machinations and free-spending ways, his
club has won only two championships in almost 20 years. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note
174, at 2779-825.
217. This Article analyzes and compares the relationship between talent and success among
offensive players only. We do not address such relationship, if any, among defensive players,
particularly pitchers and fielders. The reasons are simple: the object of the game is to win by
scoring more runs than the opponent, creating runs is the essence of offense, and it is the hitter's
job to create runs for his team. For an explanation, see JAMES, supra note 195, at 273-74, 276.
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theory, and hence, the salary cap. Unless both assumptions are true,
the theory falls of its own weight.
The first assumption is that an individual player's talent can accu-
rately predict his success at any given time during play. In other
words, a player who does his job well predictably produces benefits
(usually in the form of runs) for his team.
The second assumption is that a player's individual success can ac-
curately predict his team's success. In other words, a player who pro-
duces benefits predictably produces victories too.
As applied to Major League Baseball, neither assumption is true.
We quite agree that without talent, ballplayers cannot succeed, and
without successful ballplayers, baseball clubs cannot succeed. But it is
another matter altogether to predict accurately when their success is
going to happen. We demonstrate below.
1. Talent Cannot Predict Individual Success
Defining baseball success is not hard at all. It has plenty to do with
talent. The most talented hitter in the league is, by definition, the
most successful: he is the player who wins the batting title at the end
of the season. But predicting who that player will be at the beginning
of the season is next to impossible.
If the competitive balance theory worked, then an offensive player's
athletic ability-to "see" the ball, swing the bat well, and get "good
wood" on it-would have to predict success on the field, including,
more often than not, getting on base, advancing runners, and scoring
runs. The salary cap is premised upon the assumption that such suc-
cess can be purchased because success among talented ballplayers is
predictable.
Baseball, however, defies predictability. We can know who is most
talented, but not when he will be successful. The result is a compara-
tively random system. To account for baseball's unpredictability,
players, fans, and even sportswriters have made corresponding down-
ward adjustments in their measurements of what constitutes individ-
ual player success. Instead of expecting top offensive players to play
.700 or .600 ball, as we do in football and basketball, we tolerate .300
or even .200 ball. A .300 hitter is someone who is talented; a .200
hitter is someone who is not so talented. Inevitably, these adjustments
run in precisely the opposite direction needed to predict successful
performance (the more the success rate surpasses 500o, the more pre-
dictable is successful performance). In the case of the .300 or .200
hitter, batting average is really a better predictor of failure than suc-
cess.
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But no adjustment in the definition of success in baseball can
change the nature of predictability. One measure of success is produc-
ing a good result more than 50% of the time. The more often the
good result is produced the more predictable is the success. We can
call someone who succeeds only three out of every ten at-bats a "suc-
cess" all we like, but the numbers are a better predictor of when he
will fail than when he will succeed.
Consider a hitter who bats .400 for a full season, something nobody
but Hall of Fame slugger Ted Williams 218 has done in more than half a
century. By most measurements, this performance would not be con-
sidered great, or even good. It means the hitter is failing "only" 60%
of the time. But to a baseball fan, hitting .400 is astounding. Hitting
.500? Unimaginable. Batting .600? Impossible.
Yet outside the baseball world even the unimaginable .500 success
rate simply indicates a purely random system: 50% of the time the
hitter succeeds, 50% of the time he fails. For a given at-bat, we could
predict the .500 hitter's success just as easily by flipping a coin.
The unpredictability of baseball success is reflected in both lore and
ledger. As for lore, baseball, wags like to remind us, is a sport in
which an offensive player is considered a success if he fails only 70%
of the time.219 "If Joe Montana or Dan Marino completed three of
every ten passes they attempted, they would be ex-professional quar-
terbacks," says Ted Williams. "If Larry Bird or Magic Johnson made
three of every ten shots they took, their coaches would take the bas-
ketball away from them." 20
As for ledger, the statistics reveal relative inconsistency even when
baseball's highest-paid-and presumably most talented -hitters
achieve success. Two statistics are especially illuminating: the predict-
ability of individual success in the three major professional sports (a)
from game to game and (b) from season to season.
(a) Game Consistency.22'
We explain below why an individual player's effort often does not
218. Outfielder, Boston Red Sox, 1939-1960. Admitted to Hall of Fame, 1966. Career bat-
ting average, .344. In 1941, Williams batted .406 and remains the last major leaguer to bat at
least .400. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 1620.
219. E.g., WARD & BuRNs, supra note 27, at xix.
220. TED WHYILAMS & JOHN UNDERWOOD, THE SCIENCE OF HrrrIro 7 (Fireside rev. ed. 1986).
221. A word about the methodology. Game-by-game statistics across sports are somewhat
unreliable for a number of reasons: (1) it is difficult to ascertain what precise measure to use that
is comparable in each sport; (2) each regular season in professional sports season has a different
length-for example, football's 16 games to baseball's 162; and (3) individual players from sport
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ensure his success, 222 but for our purposes here it is sufficient to ana-
lyze how consistently the top players are (or are not) successful.
How often will a player, in any individual game, fail to perform at
a level within 50% of his season average? We examined the statistics
of the top ten salaried performers in each sport. Tables 6, 7, and 8
summarize the results:
TABLE 6 2
Per Game Failure Rates of Top-Salaried Baseball Players, 1993
Player Salary Failure Rate (o)
Bobby Bonilla $ 6,300,000 33.8
Joe Carter 5,500,000 29.8
Rafael Palmeiro 5,406,603 29.3
Cal Ripken, Jr. 5,400,000 30.9
Roberto Alomar 5,333,334 19.3
Jose Canseco 5,100,000 30.9
Kirby Puckett 5,200,000 27.1
Barry Bonds 4,984,300 29.2
Rickey Henderson 4,800,000 26.7
Ruben Sierra 4,700,000 39.0
to sport have disparate opportunities to participate in the offensive side of the game.
The measures chosen here were expressed by common percentages used to indicate offensive
success: for baseball, the percentage of hits per at-bats (batting average); for basketball, the
percentage of field goals per attempts (field goal percentage); and for football, the percentage of
completions per attempts (passing completion rate). A baseball player's offensive participation is
more limited than in other sports. A hitter playing nine innings takes about four at-bats per
game, whereas a basketball star playing 60 minutes takes about 20 shots per game. Fewer oppor-
tunities to participate in the offensive game naturally make the results in baseball more unpre-
dictable. But that is the point: a baseball player, in any individual game, has fewer opportunities
to display his "talent" due to his limited participation. See infra notes 273-77 and accompanying
text (discussing baseball's limited participation rules).
222. For example, consider the lack of "directedness" in the hitter's task as compared to
that of his counterparts on offense in basketball or football. See infra notes 259-72 and accom-
panying text.
223. The list of the top 10 players by salary is based on published figures for 1994. See
Baseball's Elite, L.A. TimEs, July 17, 1994, at C14. The figures were derived as follows. We
tracked the top 10 players through newspaper box scores for the 1993 season. Only non-pitchers
were considered. Their success was defined by batting average. For example, a player whose
season batting average is .300 (meaning overall he averages almost one hit per three at-bats) shall
achieve 50% of his season average by getting at least one hit per six at-bats per game (an average
of .167). For all practical purposes, a ballplayer's failure to achieve 50% of his overall season
average in a given game means he is going hitless.
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The results are telling. In baseball, a top player will not perform at
the 50% level 3001o of the time.226 In basketball the figure is less than
224. The list of the top 10 basketball players by salary is based on published figures from
1991. See The 1991 Sport 100 Salary Survey, SPORT, June 1991, at 41-60. The figures were de-
rived as follows. We tracked the top 10 players through newspaper box scores for the 1993-94
season. Only starting players were tracked. Success was defined by shooting percentage. (Games
in which a player took fewer than four shots were excluded.)
Although Michael Jordan and Earvin "Magic" Johnson were among the top 10 highest-paid
starters in 1991, they are excluded from the tally here because both were retired during the 1993-
94 season. Thus only eight players were actually reviewed through that season.
225. The list of the top 10 football players by salary is based on published figures from 1991.
Id. at 41-60. The figures were derived as follows. We tracked performance through newspaper
summaries for the 1993 season. Only quarterbacks were reviewed. Success was defined by pass-
ing completion percentage.
226. Based on the method explained above, see supra note 223, we calculate the average per
game failure rate of the 10 most highly paid baseball players at 29.8%.
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5 0227 and in football it is close to 0q0. 228 From game to game, the
success of baseball players is much less predictable than it is in the
other sports.
(b) Season Consistency.
How often will a top player not come close to or exceed his cumula-
tive average in any given season? Again we examined the statistics of
the top ten salaried performers in each sport. Tables 9, 10, and 11
summarize the results:
TABLE 9229
Per Season Failure Rates of Top-Salaried Baseball Players
(Through 1993)











*Excludes 1993 season due to injury.
227. Under the method explained above, see supra note 224, we calculated the average per
game failure rate of these basketball players at 4.7%.
228. Under the method explained above, see supra note 225, we calculated the quarterbacks'
per game average failure rate at 1.0%. In fact, nine of the 10 players posted average failure rates
of 0.0%.
229. We tracked the same baseball players as above in measuring average season failure
rates. See text accompanying supra note 223. We define "coming close" as within 5% or better,
in a given season, of a player's lifetime batting average entering such season. For example, if a
player has a lifetime batting average of .300 when he arrives to play on Opening Day, he needs
to hit at least .285 during the new season to come within 5% of his lifetime average.
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TABLE 10230
























*Excludes 1985-86 season due to injury.
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230. The top 10 basketball players are rated based upon salary data available in 1991. See
supra note 224. We define "coming close" as within 5% or better of a player's lifetime shooting
percentage. We tracked these players through the 1991-92 season only.
Interestingly, when age is taken into account, the failure rate is 0.0%. That is, the only players
who failed to reach their lifetime averages in a given season were players who had played more
than 10 years. The data suggest a basketball player in his prime consistently comes close to or
betters his lifetime average each season. This is not true in baseball, where even a player in his
prime does not consistently meet or beat his lifetime average. See supra Table 9.
231. We identified the top 10 quarterbacks based on figures available in 1991. See supra
notes 225 and 228. We define "coming close" as within 5%c/ percent or better of a quarterback's
cumulative passing completion percentage. We tracked players only through the 1991 season.
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In baseball, a top-salaried player's average failure rate is 25%.232 In
basketball, the number is less than 9010233 and in football less than
12%.24 From season to season, the baseball player's success is much
less predictable than in other sports.
This Article has undermined the competitive balance theory's first
assumption. Compared to other professional sports, individual talent
in baseball cannot accurately predict individual success. How does this
affect the salary cap proposal?
It means that buying the "best" players, as measured by baseball
standards, is a risky investment. From game to game or season to sea-
son-for that matter, from at-bat to at-bat or inning to inning-it is
difficult to know when even a star will come through when his team
needs him. Eventually, the star will hit his hits and homer his homers;
but so will the players of lesser talent. For either type of ballplayer,
however, the problem is the same: we cannot predict with any cer-
tainty how often he will succeed.
2. Individual Success Cannot Predict Team Success
We define success as the competitive balance theory would-mak-
ing the playoffs.23 If the competitive balance theory was valid, then a
wealthy owner could buy a division title, league pennant, and World
Series championship simply by signing the most talented players. The
team with the largest payroll would win it all.236 Even if this assump-
232. The actual average failure rate per season is 24.5%.
233. The actual average failure rate per season was 8.70o.
234. The actual average failure rate per season was 11.8%.
235. Of course, real success to an owner means making money, not simply making the play-
offs (although the two goals are certainly intertwined for most clubs). The latter creates an audi-
ence for the team, and having an audience generates revenues through broadcast viewership,
ballpark attendance, and ancillary marketing.
For example, a comparison of 1994 baseball attendance records with divisional standings re-
veals a direct correlation between the two. That is, teams at the top of a division draw well and
teams at the bottom draw poorly. For example, the four American League playoff contenders-
division leaders Texas, Chicago, and New York, plus "wild card" leader Cleveland-were
among the six highest teams in league attendance. See Final 1994 Major League Baseball Stand-
ings, L.A. TIMiEs, Sept. 15, 1994, at C12. Conversely, the three last-place teams-California,
Milwaukee and Detroit-were among the five lowest in attendance. Id.
Similarly, the four National League playoff contenders-division leaders Los Angeles, Cincin-
nati, and Montreal, plus "wild card" leader Atlanta-were among the six highest teams in
league attendance. Id. Two of the three last place teams were among the bottom half. Id. The
exception, of course, was the Chicago Cubs. As Cub fans know, their team loyalty transcends
winning and losing. (Colorado and Florida were excluded from the National League attendance
statistics because as expansion franchises, their attendance may have been artificially inflated by
the newness of the franchise in their cities.)
236. This assumes the owner bought the right talent. But see HELYAR, supra note l1, at 214-
15 (citing examples of owners' paying high salaries to mediocre players).
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tion holds true in other enterprises, such as professional basketball
and football, 37 it does not hold true in baseball.
This assumption also depends upon the first assumption that indi-
vidual talent predicts individual success. As we have shown, this is not
true. So the difficulty of predicting team success based upon individ-
ual success not only persists, but also is magnified. Whatever correla-
tion exists between individual talent and individual success, the
correlation between individual success and team success is so attenu-
ated as to be virtually nonexistent.
Two famous anecdotes reflect the unpredictability of team success
in baseball. First, in 1960, the heavily-favored New York Yankees 238
outscored the underdog Pittsburgh Pirates23 9 by twenty-eight runs in a
seven-game World Series-an average of four runs per game-yet lost
the championship when Pirate second baseman Bill Mazeroski hom-
ered in the bottom of the ninth inning in game seven. 240 Mazeroski
had hit only eleven home runs during the regular season. 24'
Second, in 1988, the Oakland Athletics, winners of 104 regular sea-
son games, were beaten by the Los Angeles Dodgers, winners of
ninety-four regular season games, in a five-game World Series.24 2 In
game four, the Dodgers started a lineup averaging only .252-reputed
to be the weakest-hitting club in Series history.2 43 But the turning
point for the Dodgers came in game one, with two outs in the bottom
of the ninth inning. Left fielder Kirk Gibson, injured so badly he did
not even suit up for the start of the game, dressed later and pinch-hit
a two-run homer to catapult Los Angeles from a 4-3 deficit to a 5-4
victory.2" It was Gibson's only at-bat of the Series.
237. This Article does not offer an opinion on the subject.
238. Regular season record, 97-57 (.630). BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 353.
239. Regular season record, 95-59 (.617). Id. at 352.
240. See, e.g., WARD & BURNS, supra note 27, at 365.
241. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 1201.
242. Id. at 2813.
243. TiE OsCsIAL 1988 WORLD SERIES VIDEO (CBS/Fox Sports 1988) (remarks of NBC
commentator Bob Costas). Afterwards, the winning team's skipper reflected:
Well, first of all you should give the MVP [award] to Bob Costas because we were in
the clubhouse before the game began and he mentioned that this is the weakest hitting
team ever to play in the World Series. Now to me what a tremendous victory it is for
the weakest team to ever be played [sic] in the World Series to beat out one of the best
teams that was ever put in the World Series.
Id. (quoting remarks of Los Angeles Dodgers manager Tom Lasorda).
244. WARD & BURNS, supra note 27, at 455-58.
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By now it should surprise no one that there is almost no useful cor-
relation between a team's big payroll and its success. There are at least
two ways to study this relationship: (a) by examining how successful
well-paid teams are and (b) by examining how well-paid are successful
teams.
(a) How Successful Are Well-Paid Teams?
There are twenty-six nonexpansion baseball teams. 24 Before 1994,
only four teams each year could expect to advance to the playoffs. In
theory, at the beginning of the season, every team had an 85076 chance
of failing to make the playoffs. 24 If there were a perfect correlation
between paying high salaries and making the playoffs, then the four
most well-paid teams would never fail to make the playoffs. If there
were no correlation between team payroll and team performance, then
the four-best paid teams would fail to make the playoffs 85076 of the
time, just like everyone else.
From 1989 to 1993, only six of Major League Baseball's twenty
playoff teams ranked among the four best-paid clubs for the season in
question. 247 Thus the clubs with the four biggest payrolls failed to
make the playoffs 7500 of the time. These clubs did only marginally
better than the average-paid team (which fails to qualify 85% of the
time). At best, only a weak correlation exists between paying high sal-
aries and making the playoffs.2 48
(b) How Well-Paid Are Successful Teams?
By definition, the median team with respect to salary is about thir-
teenth.2 49 If there is no correlation between success (making the play-
offs) and being well-paid, then the average playoff team's payroll will
245. The National League's expansion teams, Colorado and Florida, have been excluded
from the calculations here because first-year expansion clubs are notorious for performing
poorly. None has ever made the playoffs.
246. The actual rate is 84.6%. The figure is derived by dividing the number of non-qualify-
ing teams (22) by the number of total teams (26).
247. For club payroll information, see Michael Ozanian, The $11 Billion Pastime, FIN.
WORLD, May 10, 1994, at 50, 52-56 (1993 season); Michael Ozanian, et al., Foul Ball, FIN.
WORLD, May 25, 1993, at 18, 28 (1992 season); Michael Ozanian & Stephen Taub, Big League,
Bad Business, FIN. WORLD, July 7, 1992, at 34, 50-51 (1991 season); Market vs. Payroll, USA
TODAY, Dec. 12, 1990, at CII (1990 season); Mets Have Highest Payroll; Phillies The Lowest,
USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 1989, at C12 (1989 season).
248. The same holds true for the strike-shortened 1994 season. Four of the top six salaried
teams-nearly 67%-were not among the division leaders. See Budget vs. Performance, Tiar,
Aug. 22, 1994, at 70.
249. Actually, across a spectrum of 26 participants the midpoint falls between 13 and 14, or
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rank at or near thirteenth in the league. If there is a perfect correla-
tion, then the average playoff team's payroll will rank between second
and third.210
From 1989 to 1993, the average playoff team ranked only tenth in
salary. 25 Again we find only a weak correlation between team payroll
salary and team performance. Far from carrying the heftiest payrolls,
playoff teams pay only above-average salaries. 252 Spending a lot of
money guarantees nothing. A number of highly paid teams did quite
well,253 but so did a number of poorly paid teams. 2- Finally, on the
day last summer's strike began, the small market Montreal Expos-
ranked twenty-seventh among twenty-eight teams in terms of salary-
had the best record in baseball. 2"1
C. Why Baseball Is Unpredictable
Why is baseball so unpredictable relative to other team sports? Why
do the assumptions about individual talent translating into individual
success, and individual success translating into team success, fail? Per-
haps it is because, as some have observed, baseball mimics life. 216 Like
250. Until this year, only four teams could make the playoffs. Thus the midpoint is between
second and third place, or 2.5.
251. The actual average is 9.7. For 1994 the average is even worse: 10.8.
252. Former California Angel Manager Whitey Herzog opined that to remain competitive a
team would need to pay at least between $27.5 million and $30 million "and then you've got to
get lucky." Bob Nightengale, Strike Losses Not Merely Peanuts, L.A. TimEs, Aug. 18, 1994, at
Cl. A $30 million payroll would fall below the 1994 median team payroll of $32 million. For a
summary of 1994 median team payrolls, see Budget vs. Performance, TiME, Aug. 22, 1994, at
70.
253. For example, the American League pennant-winning and defending two-time World
Champion Toronto Blue Jays had baseball's highest payroll in 1992 and 1993. Of course, when
the strike-shortened 1994 season ended August 12, the Blue Jays were mired in third place in the
American League East with a losing record (55-60, .478). Final Major League Baseball Stand-
ings, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1994, at C12.
254. Some low-payroll clubs which recently have won division pennants include the 1989
Chicago Cubs (I 8th), the 1990 Pittsburgh Pirates (17th), and the 1991 Atlanta Braves (22d).
255. Budget vs. Performance, Tsra, Aug. 22, 1994, at 70. Unfortunately salary information
before 1989 is difficult to obtain. But anecdotal evidence suggests if the data were carried back
over a longer period of time the weak correlation might dissolve into absolutely no correlation or
even a negative correlation. For example, Calvin Griffith and Charles 0. Finley, former owners
of the Minnesota Twins and Oakland A's, respectively, were notoriously tight-fisted. Yes, in the
decade from 1965 to 1974, their teams combined to finish first six times and appear in four
World Series-winning three of the latter.
256. See generally THoMAs BOSWELL, How LIFE IMITATES THE WORLD SERIEs (1982). Writes
Boswell:
That is baseball's greatest blessing and the source of its richness: you play it every
day. Consequently, baseball has no "game face"-no mood of real or feigned mortal
crisis that must be put on like a protective psychological mask before leaping into the
fray. As lex-Baltimore Orioles manager Earl] Weaver's pitching coach Ray Miller puts
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the rest of our lives, a baseball game contains long stretches where
nothing happens, punctuated by short periods of intense activity in
which seemingly arbitrary and unfair results occur. There may be "no
crying in baseball,"2 7 but there certainly is a lot of luck. 258
We think the extent to which baseball contests result in seemingly
unfair or unpredictable outcomes-randomness-is a product of three
things: (1) the mechanics of hitting, (2) the sport's limited offensive
participation rules, and (3) the changing playoff format.
1. The Mechanics: Hitting and "Directedness"
Baseball's most apocryphal story involves, naturally, George Her-
man "Babe" Ruth.2 19 During the 1932 World Series against the Chi-
cago Cubs, legend has it, Ruth grew so irritated with the Chicago
faithful jeering him in Wrigley Field that he made a prediction: during
a trip to the plate in the fifth inning, the Yankee slugger pointed to
the center field bleachers to indicate where he would hit the next ball
for a home run. He then homered over the center field fence.26
Ruth's "called shot" is storied, and so controversial, precisely be-
cause of its implausibility. 261 It is nearly impossible to hit a baseball on
purpose to a specific location. It is hard enough just to hit the thing,
which is why Ted Williams said the hardest thing to do in sports is to
hit a round ball with a round bat .62
it, "It's never fourth-and-one in baseball."
That sense of moderation-of both physical and emotional temperance in all the
familiar acts of the game-is almost a philosophical precept. Given a choice between
raw effort and controlled skill, the latter will usually win in baseball.
Id. at 5.
257. Joe Duggan, A LEAGUE OF TEtR OWN (Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., motion
picutre 1992) (line spoken by actor Tom Hanks).
258. See supra notes 217-44 and accompanying text.
259. Pitcher, Boston Red Sox, 1914-1918, Outfielder, Boston Red Sox, New York Yankees,
Boston Braves, 1919-1935. Admitted to Hall of Fame, 1936. Career batting average, .342. Ca-
reer home runs, 714. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 1421. Ruth has been so impor-
tant to the sport and its culture that Hofstra University presented a three-day conference this
year just to honor his 100th birthday. See Robert Jarvis, Babe Ruth as Legal Hero, 22 FLA. ST.
U. L. R v. 885 (1995); see also Registration Program, Baseball and the "Sultan of Swat, " Apr.
27-29, 1995.
260. Whether the story is true or not is moot; the mere fact the story is repeated as if true is
a tribute to the Babe. See, e.g., WARD & BuRNs, supra note 27, at 209-11. Ruth did hit two
home runs in the third game of the World Series against the Chicago Cubs on October 1, 1932.
BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 2713. The Yankees won the game, 7-5, and swept
the Series, 4-0. Id.
261. For an interesting discussion of Ruth's called shot, see JOHN M. ROSENButRG, THE
STORY OF BASEBALL 94-97 (1966).
262. Variations on this theme are usually attributed to Williams. See, e.g., WIuIA.Ms & UN-
DERWOOD, supra note 220, at 7.
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Baseball is said to be a game of inches for good reason. Results turn
on events that last milliseconds and physics that involve millimeters.
Nowhere is this more evident than in hitting, the single most meaning-
ful event in a baseball game. A baseball thrown at a speed of ninety
miles per hour takes less than one-half second to travel the sixty feet
six inches from the pitcher's mound to home plate.2 63 In this scant
amount of time, a hitter literally has only a fraction of a second 2"6 to
decide when, where, and how to swing the bat. Not surprisingly, only
a small percentage of all pitches are hit, a smaller percentage are hit
into fair territory, and only about one-quarter of those balls hit into
fair territory are hit in an area unpatrolled by a fielder.265 There is but
a brief interval in which the hitter may make a successful swing.
Therefore, successful hitting must be a learned reflex.26
No wonder a top hitter strives not to hit the ball to a particular
location, but merely to get "good wood" on the ball. He tries to
strike it squarely on the widest part of the bat267 with the maximum
velocity. Theoretically, a ball hit in this manner will travel at its maxi-
mum velocity and in its straightest path, maximizing its potential to
avoid being caught.
But a hitter's ability to get "good wood" does not necessarily trans-
late into success afield (getting a base hit). Hall of Fame right fielder
"Wee Willy" Keeler 261 attributed his success to the fact that he "hits
'em where they ain't. ' 269 Keeler's adage holds more than a grain of
truth. Getting a hit means driving the ball to a location where it will
not be caught or fielded timely. There is not necessarily a direct corre-
lation between a ball that is well-hit and a base hit. A well-hit ball
may be caught (e.g., a line-out, a deep drive to the warning track,
etc.) A poorly hit ball will not necessarily be caught (for example a
263. See ROBERT K. ADAIR, THE PHYSICS OF BASEBALL 28 (2d ed. 1994). A baseball thrown at
98 m.p.h. crosses home plate at 90 m.p.h. and spends 400 milliseconds (.4 seconds) getting there.
Id.
264. According to Williams, about 200 milliseconds (.2 seconds). WILLIAMS & UNDERWOOD,
supra note 220, at 62-63.
265. For example, in 1992 the cumulative batting average was .252 in the National League
and .259 in the American League. BASEBA.L ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 518, 520.
266. A batter whose swing misses the mark by as little as 200 milliseconds (.2 seconds) will
not hit the ball with maximum velocity. See ADm, supra note 263, at 69.
267. This part of the bat, known as the "sweet spot" to ballplayers, is called the "center of
percussion" by physicists. Id. at 71 (analysis of physics Professor Robert K. Adair). The colli-
sion of bat and ball lasts about I millisecond (.001 second). Id.
268. Outfielder, Baltimore Orioles and other teams, 1892-1910. Admitted to Hall of Fame,
1939. Career batting average, .343. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 1086.
269. E.g., WARD & BURNS, supra note 27, at 252.
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"Texas Leaguer, '2 70 a ball with "eyes, ' 27' etc.). Hitting success is not
nearly as correlated to how well the ball is hit as it is to the less pre-
dictable phenomenon of where the ball will land. Thus, the mechanics
of the game ensure randomness.
By contrast, football and basketball are "directed" sports. In these
sports, the principal offensive player, the quarterback in football or
the shooter in basketball, knows exactly what he has to do to succeed.
In baseball, what the hitter has to do to succeed is less certain. But
that is not all. In football and basketball-indeed, in every profes-
sional American sport except baseball-the offensive player controls
the ball at the start of play. In baseball, the defense controls the
ball. 272 So a hitter's success is defined less by what he does than by
what his defensive counterparts-the pitcher and fielders-fail to do.
Whereas the matter of offense in basketball and football is proactive,
in baseball it is reactive.
Compare the mechanics of baseball with those of basketball and
football. In baseball, a perfectly hit ball will produce a base hit a cer-
tain percentage of the time, perhaps 30% but certainly much less than
100% of the time. In basketball, by contrast, a perfectly shot basket-
ball produces a basket 100% of the time. By definition, a perfectly
shot basketball is one that concludes its trajectory in the center of the
basket. Basketball is a directed sport in which players aim for a spe-
cific location and success in effort translates directly into success.
Randomness in result is minimized by this direction.
This is also true of football. The object in a football game is to
advance an eligible offensive player possessing the football beyond the
goal line. The entire team is directed to moving the ball down the
field. If all the blocks are adequate and the run is long enough or the
pass is accurate enough, the ball will advance. The less optimal the
blocking and rushing or passing, the less likely the ball will advance.
Once again, success in effort translates into success in result.
2. The Rules: Equal and Limited Participation
Baseball is fundamentally more unpredictable in result than basket-
ball or football for another reason. The rules of the games of basket-
ball and football allow a team to maximize the advantage that obtains
from the participation of its best players, and the best players in each
270. A ball weakly hit behind the infield but in front of an approaching outfielder for a base
hit.
271. A ball hit sharply on the ground between infielders for a base hit.
272. See, e.g., WARD & BURNS, supra note 27, at xix.
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sport participate in the majority of plays. The rules of the game of
baseball are different.
(a) The Hitting Lineup.
If a basketball team has an extraordinary scorer, then he will shoot
more often than his teammates. If the team has an excellent re-
bounder, then he will be positioned defensively to maximize the re-
bounds he pulls down. If a football team has an extraordinary runner,
then he will carry the ball more frequently. If the team is better at
passing, then the team will pass more often (and then, probably to its
best receivers). In each sport a team may exploit to its advantage rules
permitting its ablest athletes to maximize their participation.
But if a baseball team has an extraordinary hitter, he gets just one
chance to bat every nine times his team takes a turn. The rules of the
game do not permit a player to bat out of order or more than once
every nine turns. 273 So a baseball club, unlike a basketball or football
team, cannot maximize the participation of its best players. Of course,
a club may minimally exploit the advantage it obtains from good or
powerful hitters by their positioning in the lineup, but the advantage
is trivial when compared to that in basketball or football. 274
(b) The Endgame.
The advantage that a basketball or football team obtains from the
maximum participation of its best players is heightened at the conclu-
sion of each game. If it is the fourth quarter, the score is close, and
one of the teams is the Chicago Bulls of the 1990s, then it would go
without saying Michael Jordan (at least before his twenty-one-month
"retirement") would be taking most of the shots. For the Los Angeles
273. See OFFIcIAL RULES OF BASEBALL rule 6.01(a) (SPORTING" NEWS ed. 1994) ("Each player
of the offensive team shall bat in the order that his name appears in the batting order.").
274. For example, a lead-off hitter will probably have more at-bats than a hitter at the lower
end of the lineup. But this advantage is minimal. In fact, the lead-off hitter will bat no more
than one extra at-bat per game than, say, the last hitter. A power hitter's advantage is actually
created by batting fourth, the "clean-up" spot. But after the first inning, this advantage largely
disappears because the clean-up hitter's spot could fall almost anywhere in the order in the suc-
ceeding innings.
By contrast, basketball rules permit an individual player to participate disproportionately
more frequently in a given game. For example, during the 1961-62 season, Philadelphia War-
riors' center Wilt Chamberlain averaged a whopping 50.4 points, or 4007o of his club's total
points that year. See NEFT & COHEN, PRO BASKETBALL, supra note 199, at 164.
For a baseball player to deliver a performance comparable to Chamberlain's, he would have
to drive in 273 runs. But no major leaguer has ever batted in as many as 200 runs in a single
season. In 1930, Chicago Cubs slugger Hack Wilson set the major league record of 190, or 19%
of his club's total runs that year. See BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 243.
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Lakers of the 1980s, at the conclusion of a close game it would be
inconceivable for the team to run a play without putting the ball in the
hands of Earvin "Magic" Johnson; likewise for the Boston Celtics
and Larry Bird. For years, fans of the San Francisco 49ers (and later
the Kansas City Chiefs) and the Denver Broncos have routinely ex-
pected their quarterbacks-Joe Montana and John Elway, respec-
tively-to shoulder the burden of participation at the conclusion of
close games.
But in baseball, there is no guarantee that San Francisco Giant slug-
ger Barry Bonds will bat in the ninth inning (or indeed, at any crucial
moment) no matter how close the game. The game's rules equalize the
offensive participation of every player, stars and role players alike,
during the endgame.
(c) Limited Offensive Participation.
The participation of the best players is not only roughly equal with
those of lesser players but also minimal to begin with. On average, a
hitter comes to the plate only four times per a game. Even a truly
extraordinary hitter, somebody batting .400, can expect to average no
more than 1.6 hits a game. Even the best hitters go hitless in nearly
one-third of the games.2"1 In short, a great performer has a limited
number of opportunities to perform. Contrast this with basketball or
football, where a good offensive player may be the primary focus of
thirty or forty offensive plays and involved, in one way or another, in
nearly every offensive play. 21 6
(d) Limited Defensive Participation.
In basketball or football, defensive players are involved in nearly
every single play. To the extent that a weakness exists in the defense,
the offensive teams in these sports will purposely exploit the advan-
tage. The basketball team will give the ball to the player guarded by
the weak defensive link and clear that side of the court so the game
devolves to a one-on-one contest. In football, the quarterback will
pass to the "open" receiver or the one guarded by the weakest defen-
sive back. Exploiting the weak defensive link in both sports is a func-
275. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
276. For example, in basketball a good shooter may shoot as many as 30 times per game and
participate in nearly every offensive play, even plays in which he is not shooting, by passing the
ball, setting offensive screens, acting as a decoy to permit teammates to get open for shots, etc.
In baseball, however, an offensive player spends eight of nine (or nearly 9007o) of his team's
offensive chances in the batting order sitting on the bench or roaming the basepaths, where his
contributions are not as significant.
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tion of their directedness and the fact that the offensive team
possesses the ball.
In baseball, however, a weak defensive player cannot be exploited
effectively. The hitter cannot direct the ball. In contrast to the defense
in basketball or football, the defense in baseball possesses the ball
(thus largely explaining why baseball is not an offensively directed
game).
Conversely, in basketball and football the participation of the best
defensive player can be maximized by his position on the court or
field and he may be involved in, directly or indirectly, the majority of
plays. In baseball, however, although a good defensive player's ad-
vantage can be maximized by positioning such as moving the short-
stop or center fielder, his participation is limited to begin with. On
average, any particular fielder will be involved in about only 10076 of
the plays in which a ball is hit for an out. 277
3. The Playoffs: Advancing Under the New Format
The lack of a strong predictive correlation between talent and suc-
cess is exacerbated by a third factor: the playoff system. If success is
defined as making the playoffs (a prerequisite to competing for league
pennants and, in turn, the World Series), then baseball's new format
practically guarantees that teams with mediocre (.500 or less) records
will be eligible for the post-season.
From 1947 to 1968 (the last year of play before the National and
American Leagues each split into two divisions, creating a four-team
playoff system), a team had to win about 600 of its games to qualify
for the World Series. 25 During this time only two teams qualified for
post-season play: the first place finishers in each league. In 1969 each
league split into East and West divisions. From 1969 to 1993, four
277. In general, a baseball team gets 27 outs per game. In 1992, each club averaged 5.6
strikeouts per game. See BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 518, 520. This left 21.4
"hitting" put-outs in which position players in the field could participate. Therefore, each indi-
vidual fielder participated in an average of 2.38 outs (about 8.8%) of all "hitting" put-outs. The
actual figure is probably a little higher. When the home team is leading after 8'/, innings, some-
thing that happens perhaps half the time, the game is over because there is no point in giving the
home team three more outs in which to pad its victory margin. See OFFICIAL RULES OF BASEBALL
rule 4.1 1(a) (SPORTING NEws ed. 1994).
Consider also major league fielding averages. In 1992 the American and National League each
posted a collective fielding average of .981. Errors do not occur very often and, for that reason,
fielding may not be all that significant in determining which club wins or loses the average base-
ball game.
278. From 1947 to 1968, the team entering the World Series having the fewer number of
regular season victories won an average of 94.7 games per season, or .605. BASEBALL ENCYCLO-
PEDIA, supra note 174, at 304-88.
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teams qualified each year for post-season competition. The average
minimum winning percentage required to qualify for post-season play
dropped from 60076 before the end of the 1968 season to 557o
afterward 279
Beginning in the 1994 season, the playoff format was scheduled to
expand once again. Now there are three divisions in each league. Four
teams from each league (the division winners and one "wild card"
team) qualify for post-season competition. If the minimum winning
percentage required to qualify for post-season play dropped from
60% to 55% when the format expanded from two to four teams, then
we should reasonably expect the minimum to drop from 55% to about
500 when the format expands from four to eight teams. 20
We predict, on average, the new format will produce at least one
team having a random or nearly random record. That team will never-
theless qualify for the playoffs each year and have a chance to make,
and win, the World Series. The preliminary results of the strike-short-
ened 1994 season bear this out. One division leader, the Texas Ran-
gers of the American League East, lost more games than it won. 28'
Another division leader, the Los Angeles Dodgers of the National
League West, flirted with a losing record. 282
All of which means even a team that is not comparatively successful
in the regular season can remain a contender for the World's Champi-
onship. This is a random system in action: a team which is just as
likely to win or lose a given game still has a chance to win it all. z83
279. From 1969 to 1993 (excluding the strike-shortened 1981 season), the club qualifying for
the playoffs having the fewest wins during the regular season won an average of 89.6 games per
season, or .554. Id. at 389-521.
280. Actually, 50% may slightly overstate the case because under the new format it is un-
likely the "wild card" team will have the worst record among the qualifying teams from each
league. In any event, ignoring wild card teams and considering only the six division winners
invited under the expanded playoff format, we estimate the minimum winning percentage still
dropping to about 52%.
But history suggests mediocre teams will play in the World Series even without an expanded
playoff format. The 1973 New York Mets nearly won the championship despite having won just
50.9% of their regular season games. The 1987 Minnesota Twins did win the championship de-
spite having won only 52.5% of their regular season games.
281. As the strike began on August 12, 1994, the Texas Rangers led the American League
West despite being 10 games under .500 (52-62, .456). Final 1994 Major League Baseball Stand-
ings, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at C12.
282. On August 12, 1994, the Los Angeles Dodgers led the National League West at just two
games over .500 (58-56, .509). Final 1994 Major League Baseball Standings, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1994, at C12.
283. For example, from 1947 to 1993, the NBA team having the best record in its conference
at the end of the regular season advanced to the finals 72.2% of the time. Of course, over time
the NBA's playoff format has expanded to be much broader than Major League Baseball's.
Today in the NBA, 16 teams qualify for post-season play. Moreover, during the same period,
1995]
880 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 22:827
D. The Salary Cap Revisited
Baseball's track record without a salary cap, at least during the free
agent era dating to 1975, proves a club cannot buy a division title or
league pennant, much less a World Series ring.214 The sport enjoys
remarkable competitive balance. No salary cap is needed to ensure
what baseball already has.
Owners justify their demand based on the experience of profes-
sional basketball 285 and other sports having salary caps. The compari-
son is misplaced. A better, but by no means conclusive, 8 6 case can be
made for a salary cap in basketball. A basketball team fields only five
players on the court. Each one plays a key role in the majority of a
game's offensive and defensive plays in a directed and meaningful
fashion. The play of one or two players can dramatically affect the
outcome. The entire history of NBA championships is the history of
the dominance of a few great players-from George Mikan in the
1950s and Bill Russell in the 1960s to Magic Johnson and Larry Bird
in the 1980s and Michael Jordan in the 1990s. 217 If Michael Jordan,
the NFL team having the winningest record after the.regular season advanced to the champion-
ship game 74.1% of the time. Today, 10 NFL teams qualify for post-season play.
By contrast, from 1969 to 1993, the MLB team having the best record among divisional win-
ners following the regular season advanced to the World Series just 66.7% percent of the time.
Of course, during that period, only two teams in each league qualified for the playoffs.
284. See supra notes 171-216 and accompanying text.
285. If a salary cap makes sense in NBA basketball, then it is because the purchase of even
one outstanding player's contract can mean the difference between a good season and a champi-
onship season. The success of the 1993-94 NBA champion Houston Rockets, led by center Hak-
eem Olajuwon, is a case in point. E.g., Loose Cannon Talk with Steve Hartman and Chet Forte,
XTRA-FM, San Diego, Calif., radio broadcast June 22, 1994 (remarks of basketball commenta-
for Sonny Vicaro) (describing Houston team as Olajuwon and four players "you could pick up
in a YMCA league").
286. As noted above, see supra note 237 and accompanying text, we express no opinion
about the efficacy of a salary cap in either the NBA, which has operated under a cap since 1982,
or the NFL, which adopted a cap in 1993. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 300-04.
Recently, however, players in both leagues have expressed skepticism about the need for such a
system. See, e.g., Scott Howard-Cooper, Players Dunked in a Hard Court, L.A. TImEs, July 19,
1994, at CI; NFL Players Don't Like Cap, LAs VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL SUN, Aug. 13, 1994, at
C4.
287. The championships won by the clubs on which these four men played constitute over
50% of all the NBA championships ever won:
Player Club Years Won Total
Bill Russell Boston Celtics 1957, 1959-1966,
1968-1969 11
George Mikan Minneapolis Lakers 1949-1950,
1952-1954 5
Magic Johnson Los Angeles Lakers 1980, 1982,
1985, 1987-1988 5
Michael Jordan Chicago Bulls 1991-1993 3
See NEFT & COHEN, PRo BASKETBALL, supra note 199.
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Magic Johnson, and Larry Bird all played for the same club, they
could practically guarantee a championship every year. '88
The same is not true of baseball. 289 Many of the game's greatest
players, including Ernie Banks,290 Rod Carew 2 91 Ty Cobb,2 9 2 Ted Wil-
liams, and Carl Yastrzemski,2 93 never won a championship.
It is fair to ask whether our focus on unpredictability means base-
ball is merely a game of chance in which talent has little or nothing to
do with producing winners and losers. We make no such claim. Such
a contention is a disservice to exemplary players such as San Diego
Padres outfielder Tony Gwynn, 294 who year in and year out is among
the National League leaders in batting average. Much of the reason
for success in baseball over the long run must be based on talent, and
teams with more of it will win more often than teams without it. But
in baseball winning also involves a complex maze of factors that make
predicting success-the focus of this Article-quite difficult, 295
whether we are inquiring about individual players or the teams they
play for.29 Baseball results are not purely random, but due to the
game's unpredictability, its results are more random than those in
other enterprises, such as professional basketball or football. In short,
288. The one time this trio played together for the same team, the United States' "Dream
Team" of the 1992 Summer Olympic Games, they not only won the gold medal, but also out-
scored their opponents by an incredible average margin of 44 points per game. See Nanr &
COHEN, PRO BASKETBALL, supra note 199, at 573.
289. Even the New York Yankees' four-decade-long dynasty has to be questioned as a prod-
uct of an era when so many of the game's best players, African-Americans, were excluded from
the major leagues. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the period
when the three New York teams dominated the game, see generally ROGER KAHN, THE ERA,
1947-1957: WEN THE YANKEES, TE GIANTS, AND THE DODGERS RULED THE WORLD (1993).
290. Shortstop and first baseman, Chicago Cubs, 1953-1971. Admitted to Hall of Fame,
1977. Career home runs, 512. BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 174, at 636.
291. Second baseman and first baseman, Minnesota Twins, 1967-1978, first baseman, Cali-
fornia Angels, 1980-1985. Admitted to Hall of Fame, 1991. Career batting average, .328. Ameri-
can League batting titles won, 6. Id., at 738.
292. Outfielder, Detroit Tigers, 1905-1927, Philadelphia Athletics, 1927-1928. Admitted to
Hall of Fame, 1936. Career batting average, .367 (1st all-time). American League batting titles
won, 12 (1st all-time). Id., at 770.
293. Left fielder and first baseman, Boston Red Sox, 1961-1983. Admitted to Hall of Fame,
1989. American League batting titles won, 3. Triple Crown Winner, 1967 (last in MLB). Id., at
1639-40.
294. Outfielder, San Diego Padres, 1982-present. Career batting average, .333. National
League batting titles won, 4. Id., at 972. Gwynn is one of the more unfortunate 1994 strike
victims. With over two-thirds of the season completed, he had batted .394 and threatened to
become the first major leaguer to hit .400 or better since Ted Williams batted .406 in 1941.
295. See supra notes 217-55 and accompanying text.
296. Which probably explains why oddsmakers typically do not offer "point spreads" to
baseball bettors. By contrast, predicting the winner of a basketball or football contest is much
easier. As a result, basketball and football bettors must not only pick the winner but also "beat
the spread."
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because an owner cannot simply predict success, he cannot simply buy
it either.2 97 If the sole legitimate justification for the salary cap is
maintaining competitive balance, then the salary cap strikes out.
IV. CONCLUSION
[W/ho says there have to be owners in baseball?
Ken Burns298
We are under no illusion that demonstrating how the salary cap
flunks the "rule of reason" test will stop owners from wanting one
anyway. Given a lawful chance, few employers in any industry could
resist putting a ceiling on payrolls. The reason is as fundamental to
labor relations in baseball as it is to labor relations in any industry:
the people who do the work feel entitled to share the profits, while the
people they work for view workers' feelings (if not the workers them-
selves) as nettlesome costs standing in the way of keeping those prof-
its.299
The result of this irreconcilable conflict is the persisting labor strife
we have come to expect of Major League Baseball. Certainly other
American industries have their troublesome workplace disputes, but
professional baseball's eight work stoppages in twenty-two years stand
out as particularly contentious. There are at least two reasons for this.
First, of course, is the sport's special antitrust exemption. As we
have explained, 3°° the exemption is quite broad, and its breadth has
both dulled the owners' competitive edge and exacerbated their poor
relations with the players.
Second is something rarely found on labor's side of the equation:
real bargaining power. At an average salary of $1.2 million 01 and a
minimum salary of $109,000,302 today's major league playing-field
297. See, e.g., Allan D. Frank, Top Dollar Isn't Top Dog, FORBES, Apr. 4, 1988, at 62
("Baseball owners usually break their hearts trying to buy a pennant. The owners of the Pitts-
burgh Pirates are going at it another way-assembling the low-cost producer."). Although the
1988 Pirates did not win their division, the 1990, 1991, and 1992 teams did. BASEBALL ENcYCLo-
PEDIA, supra note 174, at 493-521.
298. Filmmaker, quoted in Ken Burns, Preface to Geoffrey C. Ward & Ken Burns, Baseball:
The Way It Was, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP. Aug. 29-Sept. 5, 1994, at 54, 58 (excerpting GEOF-
FREY C. WARD & KEN BURNS, BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY (1994)) [hereinafter Burns,
Preface].
299. For a thoughtful discussion of labor-management conflict in the context of the summer
1994 baseball strike, see Neal Gabler, The Owners: Baseball's Newest Heroes, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
7, 1994, at Mi.
300. See supra notes 112-66 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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employee has a lot more money than his working counterpart in just
about any business one can name. One ballplayer alone possesses
unique skills that may be difficult, but not impossible, to replace. But
all ballplayers together possess skills that cannot be replaced.0 3 Acting
in concert, as they did last summer, major leaguers can bring the
game to a halt. Since 1969, they have not hesitated to do so when they
felt owners threatened their fundamental interests.
As momentous as it may seem, the salary cap proposal merely man-
ifests a continuing struggle between labor and capital for control of
the industry. This struggle has always percolated beneath the surface
of the professional game. 3°4 Only recently has it boiled over for every-
one to see. If somehow we could make the salary cap or its cousins,
such as the "luxury tax" plan, go away, then surely, over time, own-
ers would come up with other, equally provocative, proposals.
The key question, then, is not whether the salary cap is a good idea,
but rather what can be done to address the fundamental causes of
baseball's persistent industrial warfare.
An idea that captured the public's imagination for a time last fall
was expressed in legislation offered by several members of Congress
finally to repeal baseball's antitrust exemption. 05 The MLBPA and
players' spokesmen promised to play ball again,35t even without a new
collective bargaining agreement in place, if the exemption were re-
pealed because owners then would be vulnerable to some or all of the
potential liabilities we have considered here.? 7 Repeal would dangle
an incentive, if not pose a threat, persuading owners to take the salary
cap proposal off the table and thereby to seek a settlement.
Repeal is tempting, but it would create new problems. Tearing
down the antitrust shield certainly would place in the union's hands
another weapon, litigation, that might temporarily be used against
owners in lieu of the strike. But threatening antitrust litigation neither
precludes strikes and lockouts nor guarantees any dispute will be set-
tled out of court. Indeed, it does not even promise the players would
prevail on any of their potential theories of antitrust liability. For
those who believe the solution to conflict is avoiding rather than invit-
ing litigation, repeal is not much of an answer.
303. For a discussion of labor's bargaining power in Major League Baseball, see Christopher
D. Cameron, Lessons for Labor Unions, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 1994, at A13.
304. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 113 (collection of proposed legislation).
306. See, e.g., Murray Chass, Baseball; Union Talks of Solidarity, and of Return, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995, at B9; BaseballLegislation Introduced, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1995, at C2.
307. See supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text.
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Other, more systemic changes deserve the attention of combatants
and commentators alike. For example, if owner-player relations are
the root of the trouble and if the game can be played without owners
but not without players, then why not eliminate the owners? Among
the alternatives that would do so are public ownership of baseball
franchises, °0 purchased perhaps through the government's powers of
eminent domain;3 creation of a new major league,310 perhaps by a
players' collective or a joint venture with private investors;3 '" and
player ownership of the clubs themselves, accomplished perhaps by
leveraged buyout. After all, the average major leaguer is wealthy
enough to buy a stake in his club and to start working for himself. As
workers at other employee-owned enterprises have learned, people
who own the company tend to avoid going on strike against them-
selves. And their stake in the business helps provide stable service to
consumers.
Whatever the solution, it must account for baseball's special status
not only as American industry, but also as an integral element of
American culture. 1 2 We should honor, as filmmaker Ken Burns has
said, "a sense that those who play and those who own the teams are
custodians not [merely] of their tangible assets or their bankable skills
but [also] of something larger for the country.""'
308. See, e.g., Bob Katz, Seize Every Team!, NATION, Sept. 26, 1994, at 297.
309. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (1982). For an analysis of
wielding the eminent domain power to condemn professional sports franchises, see generally
Charles Gray, Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74 CALn. L. REV. 1329 (1986).
310. E.g., WARD & BuRNS, supra note 27, at 39-40 (describing original Players' League
founded by John Montgomery Ward in 1890 and crushed by owners the same year).
311. Id. The only rival league to make any headway in this century, the Federal League, was
composed of private owners who could not crack the National or American Leagues. It folded
after two seasons in 1915. Id. at 121-27.
312. WARD & BURNS, supra note 27 at 58.
313. Burns, Preface, supra note 298, at 58.
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